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GHAPTJSH I 
INTBOIXJCTION
In the wake of the great war of 1914-1918, there 
lingered in the minds of the American people that idealistic 
and crusading spirit which, under the inspiring leadership 
of Woodrow Wilson, had helped make the United States victor­
ious in battle and which gave impetus to an unprecedented 
endeavor to make secure the peace which followed. Through­
out much of the world at that time there was a strong desire 
to prevent a repetition of the horror end devastation which 
the late war had left behind it.
After the United States had entered this war, President 
Wilson became the ardent and vociferous spokesman for a number 
of principles which, many hoped, would be the basis for a 
Just and lasting peace. The last of his Famous Fourteen Points 
was a declaration in favor of a "general association of nations" 
by which such a peace might be maintained. After the war was 
over, the fruit of Wilson's labors in this direction was the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, and from the latter part of 
1918 to the presidential election of 1920j the controversy 
over the Treaty of Versailles with this Covenant attached 
occupied the uppermost position in American politics.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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Because the iUaerican people believed that they had 
fought a war on behalf of a great cause, and because that 
crusading spirit lingered in their minds for a while there­
after, most of them seemed to favor participation in a 
system by which such a cause might be realized. This 
idealism was not to last, but while it lived, no section 
of the country was entirely immune to its effects.
Membership in the League of Nations, however, entailed 
a number of responsibilities and obligations which, most 
likely, many people did not at first take into account. The 
early enthusiasm over the idea perhaps blinded many people to 
the reality that, in joining the League of Nations, the United 
States would have, in some degree, to abandon such deep-rooted 
traditions as isolation, the Monroe Doctrine, freedom from 
"entangling alliances," and exemption from an active and posi­
tive interest in the affairs of the rest of the world.
But if the majority of the people were not at first 
aware of the implications of League membership, end if a 
majority of them showed a real sympathy for the League as 
Wilson wanted it, this was not the case in the United states 
Senate. This body, with its strong party allegiances, was 
divided from the beginning on many issues. During the de­
bates over ratification of this treaty, many of its provisions 
end implications became the objects of much declamation and 
dissension. Among other things, it was these differences
which divided the Senate into its factions, and it was the
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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unyielding stand taken by these factions which presented 
the crucial and unforceable barrier to ratification.
The Senate was divided into three distinct groups. 
Those who were opposed to American entrance into any kind 
of league constituted a small but impressive minority,^ 
mostly Republicans, and were known as the "irreoonoilables" 
or "bitter enders." They were extreme nationalists and 
isolationists who firmly believed that the United states 
should remain free from any "entangling alliances," and 
that by joining the League of Rations, the United states 
would lose the very nature of its sovereignty and indepen­
dence.
The two main factions, however, about whose differ­
ences the contest was centered, were the Administration 
Democrats and the reservationists, both "mild" and "strong". 
The Administration Democrats were those who generally 
supported Wilson for unconditional ratification of the 
treaty, and the reservationists were those senators, 
practically all Republicans, who felt that reservetlonf; 
of some sort to the Covenant were necessary adequately to 
protect the vital interests of the United States.
There were some sections of the country whose 
senators were generally united as representatives of one 
of these factions in the senate. This was particularly
^"Is Wilsonphobia to Defeat the League of Rations?" 
Current Opinion. LXVI (June, 1919), 344.
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tru« of the South, which was solidly Democratic and de­
cidedly pro-Wilson. Many senators from the Northeast 
were among those who represented a strong Republican 
opposition to the League of Nations, and party sympathies 
also prevailed among Republican senators from the Midwest. 
There was one region, however, the far Northwest, extend­
ing from the Red River of the North westward to the pacific 
Ocean, whose senators presented a sharp diversity of 
opinion.
The Northwest may be defined as the area which in­
cludes the states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, 
Idaho, Wyoming, Washington and Oregon. With the exception 
of Oregon, which attained its statehood in 1853, these 
states all entered the union at the same time (1889-1890), 
and when they drew up their respective constitutions, a 
number of common predispositions, economic and political, 
produced fundamental similarities in the new state govern­
ments.
Most of this vast area was semi-arid, and remained 
for many years a sparsely populated and mainly agricultural 
region. Moreover, before the turn of the century the 
frontier, with its free lands, had disappeared, so that 
the chief preoccupations of the settlers thereafter were 
directed to such things as reclamation and irrigation, and 
to such kindred political movements as the Farmers* 
Alliance, Populism, and other endeavors which were peculiar 
to an aggressive end discontented agrarian society.
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Because of such preoccupations, and because of the 
remoteness of the area, the people of the Northwest (as 
well as those of other parts of the west) were generally 
apathetic to American foreign policy end to what prevailed 
across the oceans. During the early days of the First 
World War, therefore, these people were less apprehensive 
over the outcome of that conflict than were people of 
other parts of the country. But when the United States 
entered the war, the Northwest responded, as did the rest 
of the country, and gave a spirited support to the American 
cause and to their leader, Woodrow Wilson. And in the 
immediate aftermath of this conflict, the Northwest shared 
with the greater part of the nation in the desire to join 
the League of Nations.
The twelve Northwest senators who participated in
this great dispute included several of the most prominent
in the nation, both on the senate floor and in activities 
2outside. But unlike their constituents, who seemed to be 
more united in their sympathies, each of these men spoke 
for himself or as a member of one of the contending fac­
tions in the Senate.
The irreooncilebles, the Republicans who opposed 
ratification of the treaty, perhaps constituted the most 
outstanding group among the Northwest senators, for the 
most famous and the most vociferous of all the members of
^Senators Kendrick of Wyoming and Chamberlain of 
Oregon were not active in the League debates.
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the Senate was William E. Borah of Idaho. Also Included 
in this group were Miles Poindexter of Washington, who was 
very prominent in Republican circles, and Asie J. Gronna 
of North Dakota. These men, including Borah with his 
thunderous attacks, denounced any international organiza­
tion which would in any degree obligate this country to 
commitments with foreign powers, or which would in,any 
way jeopardize America's complete freedom of action in its 
international relations. To each of them the League of 
Nations was, for many reasons, an instrument of evil and 
not of good.
The Administration Democrats, who were the direct 
opponents of the irreconoilables, included Thomas J. Walsh, 
a man of high ability, and Henry L. Myers, both of Montana, 
John r. Nugent of Idaho and Edwin S. Johnson of South 
Dakota. These senators defended the League of Nations and 
supported President Wilson in favoring ratification of the 
Covenant as it stood.
The other groups, all Republicans, were the reser­
vationists. The strong reservationists included Thomas 
Sterling of South Dakota, Francis E. Warren of Wyoming and 
Wesley Jones of Washington. The mild reservationists, 
Charles L. MoNery of Oregon and Porter J. MoCumber of North 
Dakota, were both ardent friends of the League and were 
willing to ratify the treaty with reservations ,
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
of a fflora Innocuous nature.^
Discounting the stand taken by the irreooncilables, 
the debates on the League of Nations centered largely 
about the question of whether the United States should 
enter the League with limited obligations, and with a 
firm hold (by reservations) on all Its traditional pre­
rogatives, or whether the United States should accept the 
restraints and obligations of a world order by ratifying 
the Covenant which Itself sufficiently safeguarded American 
Interests end policies.
The first event of national significance, the Impli­
cations of which were In part responsible for the eventual 
defeat of the League, was the Congressional elections of 
1918. These elections gave the Republicans a victory In
Àboth houses and a majority of two In the Senate. Whether 
this shift In power was due to Wilson's rash October appeal 
for a Democratic congress, or to what extent It was a re-
5pudlatlon of Wilson himself, is problematical; but of 
some significance, aside from the bitter Republican
Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Be­
trayal (New York, 1945), 57-58. (hereafter referred to as 
The Great Betrayal)
4Denna Frank Fleming, The United states and the League 
of Nations, 1918-1920 (New York, 1932), 51.
^Bailey, Woodrow Wilson end the Lost Peace (New York, 
1944), 58-70. (hereafter referred to as The Lost Peace)
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reverberations which followed the October a p p e a l ,^ is the 
fact that these elections were a direct reflection of 
popular sentiments and predispositions of the time. Though 
the issues of the coming peace were to be of prime impor­
tance for the next seventeen months, it is worth noting 
that they were contested almost solely around domestic 
questions— the host of grievances which arose out of the
7"war-time dictatorship" of the Administration.
There was virtually no issue contested and pro­
perly discussed which arose out of the policies 
that were the cause of our entering the war, of 
the degree of efficiency with which it was con­
ducted, of the aims announced for the United States 
by its official spokesman, or of the effort which 
the United States was to put forth in the making 
of a durable peace.°
In the Northwest, for example, the Nonpartisan 
League was a strong force behind state and national
g
politics. This was a farmers* organization whose chief 
complaint was that the farmer had been slighted in the 
distribution of the high profits which others had^ made 
after the outbreak of the war in E u r o p e . F o u r  of the
^Fleming, 35ff.; Charles P. Howland, American Foreign 
Relations. 1928 (New Haven, 1928), 241-2.
^Howland, 239-40, 245.
Qlbid.. 245.
*Ibld.. 241.
^^Claudius 0. Johnson. Borah of Idaho (New York.
1936)* 210.
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northwest senators who were elected or reelected in 1918
were involved in issues in which the Nonpartisen League
was interested, and three of them received the direct
support of that organization. In South Dakota, Thomas
Sterling, Republican, was elected with League support, and
in Idaho, Senators Nugent and Borah, Democrat end Republican
respectively, were both supported by the Nonpartisan League.
In MontansyThomas J. Walsh, Democrat, defended the domestic
policies of Woodrow Wilson end defeated both the Republican
11and Nonpartisan candidates.
The restiveness and general discontent manifested at 
this time is one indication that, in spite of the later mass 
enthusiasm over the League of Nations, American foreign 
policy was not to be the consuming interest of the people. 
The implication is that even though many of the senators 
elected at this time were to become very active in the de­
bates over the League of Nations, their attitudes on such 
subjects were not considered by the voters on election 
day.12
The conduct of the President himself in the ensuing 
weeks also had a bearing on the events which were to come.
A week after the Armistice, Wilson announced that he in­
tended personally to attend the peace conference. This
llRowland, 244. For a campaign speech of Walsh, 
wherein he supports Wilson's policies, see Dally 
Missoullan. November 3, 1918,
l^Rowland, 239, 294. See also Bailey, The Lost 
Peace. 65,
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unpreoadanted etep was greeted with all kinds of ooudeima- 
tions mainly by partisan Republicans. For many reasons it 
was contended that Wilson's place was at home. The Repub­
licans, for one thing, felt that the President had no
business speaking for the nation after he had been repudi-
13ated at the polls.
Also, many resented the hand-picked delegation 
which Wilson chose to take with him. Many also were un­
impressed by the calibre of this group. Republicans par­
ticularly, accused Wilson of wanting ''rubber stamps" or 
"yes men", and they were further infuriated because there 
were no important representatives of their own party on 
this delegation. Then too, the Senate, which was to 
prove very jealous of its prerogatives, was unwisely
neglected by Wilson when he deemed it improper to give
14that body some representation at the conference.
The President departed for France early in December, 
1918, end while he was there, another shortcoming served 
to irritate sensibilities at home. The first of his Pbur- 
teen Points had promised "open covenants of peace openly 
arrived at. • ." But the closed-door diplomacy which 
marked the sessions of the conference was a direct vio­
lation of this doctrine, and the result was that Wilson's 
enemies in the Senate had additional grounds for com-
l^Bailey, The Lost Peace. 71-78. 
l^Ibid.. 87-104; Rowland, 247-50.
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plaint.
The first draft of the Covenant was published in 
American newspapers on February 15, 1919, while Wilson was
1 Astill at Paris. He had requested that the Senate suspend
any action until he returned, but the Senate refused this
request with a vengeance, and senator Poindexter of
Washington announced publicly that he would make the first
17attack on the covenant. On the 19th of that month the 
onslaught began, led, as expected, by Poindexter, and over the 
days that followed, many more castigations were hurled at the 
League, including one by Borah.
In the meantime, senatorial opponents of the League,^ 
operating outside the chamber, decided that strong measures 
had to be taken as a positive indication that the Covenant 
as it stood could not be accepted. On March 3, at the in­
stance of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, 
Republican leader in the Senate end chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, a resolution was drafted which has 
since been known as the Round Robin. It was signed, by 
March 4, by thirty-nine Republican senators, including
1 Bailey, The Lost Peace. 125-33. See for example, 
the attitude of Senator Lodge on the secrecy of the confer­
ence. Fleming, 115. See also William E. Borah, "The Perils 
of Secret Treaty Making," Forum. LI (December, 1918), 657-8.
^^Fleming, 118. See for example. Daily Missoulien. 
February 15, 1919.
17Daily Missoulian. February 13, 1919.
^Qpieming, 121-52.
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from the Northwest, Gronna, Sterling, Borah, warren and Miles 
Poindexter,^® This resolution stated, first, that the signa­
tories (sufficient in number to block ratification) could not 
accept the Covenant in the form in which it was then proposed, 
Moreover, it continued, if a resolution were introduced which 
provided for the early conclusion of the peace and a later 
consideration of a league of nations, they would vote for 
that resolution.
The purpose of the Round Robin, as explained by Lodge, 
was to remind the American people, and especially the states­
men of Europe, that even though the President had negotiated 
the Treaty of Versailles, the United States was by no means 
bound by his actions. It was to be made clear that the 
United States Senate and that body alone was responsible for 
the ratification of any treaty. Moreover, he continued,
Europe should realize, in view of the late Republican victory 
in Congress, that Woodrow Wilson was no longer powerful at
home, and that successful resistance of him by the Senate
20could not be considered as an "act of bad faith."
President Wilson had returned to America on February 
23, in order to attend the closing session of the Sixty-fifth
^%enry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of 
Nations (New York, 1925), llSff. Lodge, however, lists only 
thirty-eight signatories, including himself, but the com­
plete list is found in Fleming, 154-5.
20Lodge, 120-2.
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C o n g r e s s , D u r i n g  hia short stay in this country, it beoame 
increasingly clear to him that, in view of the strong oppo­
sition in the Senate, and considering the implications of 
the Round Robin, definite changes must be made in the Coven­
ant in order that it stand any chance of ratification. And 
before he reached France for the second time, almost the
entire press of this country had agreed that amendments of
22some sort were necessary.
In accordance with a number of suggestions made by 
four eminent Republicans— William Howard Taft, Charles JSvans 
Hughes, Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root, five important 
amendments (among others) were carried through by Wilson at 
Paris. First, the language of the Covenant was rewritten 
with greater clarity. In Article 1 a clause was inserted 
which permitted a nation to withdraw from the League on two 
years notice, provided that its international obligations 
and its obligations under the Covenant had been fulfilled. 
Also, in Article 5, practically all decisions made by the 
Council or the Assembly of the League were to require 
unanimous concurrence by the members. In Article 15, a 
clause was inserted which excluded all domestic questions 
from League jurisdiction, and in Article 21 the Monroe
21Bailey, The Lost Peace. 194-5. 
^Fleming, 172-3,
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Doctrine was specificelly recognized as a regional under-
23standing not to be affected by anything in the Covenant.
With these and other changea made, the revised draft 
of the Covenant was published in American newspapers on 
April 28, 1919,^^ and formally presented to the Senate on 
July 10 of that year.
Public opinion before the Covenant was revised seems 
to have been wholeheartedly in favor of the League of Nations. 
In June, after the finished product had met the public eye, 
such sentiments persisted.
There can be no doubt where the American people 
stand on this issue. Over half the state legisla­
tures have passed resolutions favoring the idea of 
the League of Nations. Both political parties have 
planks in their platforms endorsing the ifea. The 
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in /uaerica, 
the American Federation of Labor, the National 
Grange, and the Federation of V/omen*s Clubs, and 
hosts of other national, state and local organiza­
tions are all in favor of the project. There is
26
23 "Republican Contributions to the Covenant," Inde­
pendent. XCVXII (May 24, 1919), 275, Ix)dge himself refused 
to offer suggestions outright to Wilson, as he claimed that 
he could not speak for the senate. Fleming, 181. But when 
William Howard Taft, an ardent friend of the League, spoke 
personally with Wilson, just before the letter's second de­
parture for France, he advised Wilson to amend the Covenant 
in accordance with the "constructive parts" of a speech made 
by Lodge. Ibid.. 161, Taft also had urged Wilson to make 
sure that the Covenant be “made an organic part of the treaty, 
Ibid.. 160, Wilson, however, had had this in mind from the 
Beginning. Bailey, The Lost Peace. 179-80.
24Fleming, 196. Bee for example Daily Missoulian. 
April 28, 1919,
^®Lodge, 152.
^®Bailey, The Lost Peace. 203-4.
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apparently no formidable opposition to the Covenant out­
side the United states S e n a t e .27
The Northwest was well represented in this popular 
support for the Covenant. Over the months of the contro­
versy many types of appeal endorsed the League of Nations 
and declared themselves in favor of American participation.
Among the many farm organizations which endorsed the League
28of Nations was the Nonpartisan League. This organization 
had, in 1913, a very strong control over the government of 
North Dakota, 20,000 members in South Dakota, '19,000 in
29Montana, 7,000 in Idaho and a "rapid growth in Washington." 
Many committeemen of the League to Lnforce Peace (the organi­
zation most responsible for the advertisement of the League
of Nations) were active in all seven Northwest states, and
30each one was an eminent person in his own state. Among 
state organizations were the North Dakota Grangers and the 
Women of the Northwest through the women* s Bureau of Social
rt-iEquity of the Council of the Women Voters of Oregon, Votes 
taken by state members of the National Economic League dis-
27Hamilton Holt, "The Senate Versus the People," In­
dependent, XGVIII (June 7, 1919), 351-2. For an analysis of 
public opinion in the spring of 1919, see Ruhl J. Bartlett, 
The League to .Enforoe Peace (Chapel Hill, 1944), 130-1.
BByhis and other petitions were printed in the Con­
gressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, LVIII, 7481ff.
29 "Non-Partisan League," Bellman. XXIV (March 23, 
1918), 314.
Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 7482-6.
31lbid.. 7486-7.
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olosed a majority in favor of the League of Nations in each
32northwest state except Wyoming, where the vote was a tie.
And in a petition signed by representative citizens who were 
chosen for their competence to speak for the sentiments of 
their respective states, the Northwest was again well repre­
sented by many eminent people who urged ratification without 
delay,®®
Among the state legislatures to endorse the League of 
Nations by concurrent resolution were those of Washington 
and North Dakbta,^^ The legislature of Idaho, however, 
opposed the League of Nations, This body, in March, 1919, 
declared itself unequivocally against a league in any form.®® 
It also strongly attacked Wilson for his autocratic methods, 
end his seeking to impose such a proposition on the American 
people against their will. It urged the United States Senate 
to oppose ratification, in part, because thirty-seven senators
I» c
had previously declared themselves against it.
52lbid.. 4827-0.
®®Ibid.. 5363-5.
Current History. X (June, 1919), 509. The first 
North Dakota resolution, March 3, 1919, was read into the 
Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, LVIII, 49-50. 
A second North Dakota resolution, December 10, 1919, was 
also printed into the Congressional Record. 66 Congress,
2 Session, LIX, 1208.
35Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 132.
®®Referring, of course, to the Round Robin, Thirty- 
seven senators had signed this document on March 3, 1919, 
but two more added their names the following day, making a 
total of thirty-nine. See Lodge, 120; Daily Missoulian. 
March 4, 1919.
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There Is no reason to suspect, judging from the strong 
language of this resolution, that the Idaho legislature 
changed its attitude as time went on. The resolution was 
passed, however, before the Covenant had been revised, and 
before any real indication of public opinion had been dis­
closed.
In any event, the general picture seemed favorable.
If the organizations and individuals could not speak for all
the people whom they were supposed to represent, yet as seen
by one analyst, there was apparently no hostile majority in
38a single state.
In the Senate itself in June, 1919, the situation
also appeared propitious, at least on the surface. Twelve
senators (the irreooncilables) declared themselves against
the League. Twenty remained doubtful and sixty-four were in 
39favor of it. The sixty-four who favored the.League con­
stituted the required two-thirds majority for ratification,
60 that whatever the remaining "doubtful" senators chose to 
do, no less than two-thirds, apparently, could be counted 
upon to ratify the treaty.
Unfortunately for the treaty’s sake, however, these 
sixty-four senators were not consistent, or rather they were
3?Bartlett, 130-1.
^^Ibid.. 130.
39"Is Wilsonphobia to Defeat the League of Nations?" 
Current Opinion. LI7I (June, 1919), 344.
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not united, when they maintained that they were in favor of 
American entrance into the League of Nations. After the 
Covenant had been revised, there were many who claimed that 
sufficient changes had not been made, or that those changes 
which were made were unsatisfactory.
for the most part, It was the Democrats, the friends
of Wilson, who were convinced that the Covenant spoke for
Itself and that In Its final form it met with all the
objections previously raised. At least one Republican,
MoNary of Oregon, had voiced satisfaction with the amended 
40Covenant, and MeCumber of North Dakota was to Indicate 
the same satisfaction In his speeches and In his voting.
But the bulk of the Republicans, whether for the League or 
not, were anything but satisfied that the United States 
could ratify the treaty without Jeopardizing Its sovereignty 
or security. As It turned out, several of the very amend­
ments which Wilson had laboriously managed to add to the 
Covenant were those about which the most heated alterca­
tions raged.
Sllhu Root expressed several of those doubts upon 
which the Republicans would base their objections. In the 
clause concerning withdrawal, there was nothing, apparently, 
which prevented the Council from deciding that a nation's 
obligations had not been fulfilled. The Monroe Doctrine 
clause was erroneous and ambiguous, and the Council seemed
4°Bartlett, 137.
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to be left with the power of determining **what questions 
were solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the United 
States.
The Monroe Doctrine clause was ridiculed by Lodge and 
Root, among others, because it had been defined as an inter­
national engagement. In their eyes the Monroe Doctrine was 
not an international engagement or a regional understanding. 
It was solely an American unilateral policy. It was the 
policy of the United States, and not the policy of any 
region.42
The most controversial of all the articles in the 
Covenant, however, was Article 10, This provision stipulated 
that the members of the League would undertake to guard "as 
against external aggression the territorial integrity and 
existing political independence of all Members of the League. 
In case of such agression or in case of any threat or danger 
of such agression the Council shall advise upon the means by 
which this obligation shall be fulfilled."
Root, for example, opposed this article because it 
would perpetuate the "distribution of power and territory 
made in accordance with the views and exigencies of the
II, 399-400. 
42
^^Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, 1938),
Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 161,
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
20
Allies In this present juncture of affairs."^® He considered
It to be an "Indefinite alliance for the preservation of the
44status quo. • •" Moreover, in the formulation of this article, 
nothing had been done to "limit the vast and incalculable 
obligation which Article 10 of the Covenant undertakes to 
Impose upon each member of the League. .
In the Senate, however. Article 10 was less rationally 
attacked on other counts. Aside from the "vast and incal­
culable obligation" which Article 10 imposed, it was also
46considered to be a breeder of wars. It was held by the
more implacable opponents such as Borah that Great Britain would
use it to hold down every part of her empire.*? And playing
on the sentiments of the Irish-Americans, who had been
slighted by Wilson’s failure at Paris to press for Irish
independence. Article 10 was flaunted by such senators as
an instrument by which American blood would be used to aid
40Britain in the perpetual subjection of Ireland, In fact, 
one Anglophobe pointed out that even in case of a Canadian
*^As quoted by Jessup, 292.
**As quoted by Jessup, 400,
*®As quoted by Jessup, 399.
*^Fleming, 370.
*^Ibid.. 122.
^Bailey. A Diplomatic History of the American People. 
(New York, 1940), 667-8. Two Republicans informed the British
Ambassador in Washington that "in using the Irish question
to defeat Wilson and the League they would flay England with- 
our mercy; but they wanted it understood in official British 
circles that they meant nothing by it." Ibid.. 668. (here­
after referred to as Diplomatic History),
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revolt egalnst Britain, Article 10 would forbid the United
49States from going to the aid of Canada.
Then there was Article 11, by which any war or threat 
of war was to be a matter of concern for all the other mem­
bers of the League, and by which any circumstance which 
effected International peace could be brought to the atten­
tion of the Council or the Assembly. This article was also
considered to be a breeder of wars, one which would involve
50the United States In endless conflicts. It was also
claimed that by Article 11, other nations could poke their
51noses into American affairs.
It was also argued that joining the League of Nations 
was unconstitutional, in that Congress, as a then subservient
52body, would be deprived of Its constitutional prerogatives.
A favorite argument of Borah, for example, was that the 
United States could refuse, if it wished, to obey the commit­
ments under Article 10, but the moral pressure would be so
strong as practically to deprive Congress of its legal right 
53to do so.
Another part of the treaty which displeased many sena­
tors was the fact that the British Empire {Great Britain,
^«neming, 123.
5°Ibld.. 249.
^^Balley, The Great Betrayal. 118, 
52flemlng, 143-4, 276.
SSlbld., 274.
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India and the dominions) was given six votes in the Assembly
of the League ae compared to the one granted the United
States. Even though the Empire received only one vote in
the Council and unanimity was almost always required in both
bodies, this situation was considered unfair and dangerous
to the United States.
And being, or pretending to be, altruistic, a number
of senators resented the treatment of China with respect to
Shantung. This province had been taken from Germany by
Japan in 1914, and by a secret treaty with the Allies in
1917, Japan was permitted by the peace conference to retain
55certain economic rights in Shantung. Many claimed that
if they assented to the League of Nations Covenant, which
was inextricably bound to the Treaty of peace, they would
find themselves consenting to a rank injustice.
With a number of these precepts in mind, the Foreign
Relations Committee began its long discussion of the treaty
57on July 14, 1919. Senator Lodge was chairman of this
committee, and **as the existing conditions demanded," he
made certain that there was a strong Republican opposition
58in the majority. There were seventeen members, ten Hepub-
S^Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 164-5,
^^Bailey, The Lost Peace. 143.
66Bailey, The Greet Betrayal. 161-4. 
S^Lodge, 161.
^ I b i d .. 151-2.
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59llcans, Including Borah and MoCumber, and seven Democrats.
The committee held the treaty for forty-five days and de-
60livered its report on September 10; during this time 
Wilson, in the face of strong opposition in the senate, was 
on his famous and futile tour of the west on behalf of the 
treaty.
The report consisted of three parts, one majority re-
62port and two minority reports.
The majority report, a strongly-worded document, 
recommended forty five textual amendments to the treaty and 
four reservations. Among the provisions carried by the 
amendments were the guarantee of a vote for the United States 
equal to that of the British Empire in the Assembly; end com­
plete Chinese control over Shantung. The reservations in­
cluded the unconditional right of the United States to 
withdraw from the League; a stipulation that the United 
States would not be bound by the obligations under Article 
10; and a guarantee that the United States would be the sole 
Judge of what constituted domestic questions and the meaning 
of the Monroe Doctrine.
^%cCumber was the sole Republican friend of the 
League on the Committee.
®^odge, 164.
®^Bailey, The Greet Betrayal. 90-91, 103.
G^Senate Report No. 176, 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
Senate Reports. I, September 10, 1919.
GSlbld.. Part 1.
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The first minority report (Democratic), after a few
counterblows at the majority, demanded unconditional ratifi­
aication of the treaty.
The second minority report was delivered by Senator 
McCumber, The first part of his report eloquently praised 
the framers of the Covenant and the high purpose for which 
It was formulated, and Included a lengthy condemnation of 
the bitterly partisan spirit which had marked the methods 
and deliberations of the majority. He then critically ex­
amined the provisions In the majority report and recommended 
six milder reservations of his own. These concerned with­
drawal, Article 10, domestic questions, the Monroe Doctrine, 
and a restriction upon the voting power of the British Em­
pire In case of a dispute between a nation and the Mother
65Country or between a nation and one of her dominions.
Senator Lodge, as leader of the strong reservatlonlsts, 
was correct when he stated that by the autumn of 1919, be­
cause of the long sustained debates, public opinion had come 
to favor ratification with reservations. This was especially 
true, he said, after the average man "came to realize the 
questions to be decided and especially the leading Issues 
Involved In Article X, the equality of voting, the Monroe
G^Ibld.. Part 2.
Ibid.. Part 3. MoCumber*s stand on reservations, 
as In the case of McNary, was that he believed them necessary, 
In view of the opposition, to muster enough votes for ratifi­
cation. Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 5861.
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66Doctrine and Shantung."
In the Northwest the changing public attitude wna in­
dicated in several instances. The first resolution for 
ratification by the North Dakota legislature (March 1919) 
was passed even before the first draft of the Covenant had 
been revised. In a second resolution of December, 1919, 
however, this legislature asked for ratification "with only 
such reservations as are compatible with a binding end bona
fide participation of the United States of America in the
67covenant of the League of Nations." In the poll taken of
its members by the National Economic League in September,
it was understood by the voters that reservations would not 
63be opposed. And in the aforementioned petition signed,
in August, by representative citizens of thirty-nine states,
participation in the League of Nations "with reservations
69not inconsistent with its terms" was acceptable. These 
general sentiments were also indicated when one observer 
declared that the people of the Pacific Northwest favored 
the League of Nations, but they none the less desired
G*Lodge, 179.
67Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, 
H I ,  1208.
63Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 4827-8.
69Ibid.. 5363-5.
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70reservation# "In the interest of pure Amerioanism."
The forty five textual amendments of the Foreign Re­
lations Committee were rejected by the Senate because a 
number of the Republicans (and the Democrats, of course) 
realized that such changes would be too long in adoption by 
the other powers.^^he committee thereupon continued its 
discussions, and on November 6, 1919, Lodge again reported, 
this time with fourteen reservations, including those four
of the original report, and in a language which would not
72alienate the mild reservatlonlsts. In the votes taken on
the reservations, each one was supported by an almost solid
Republican vote and opposed by an almost equally solid
73Democratic vote.
The preamble to these reservations stipulated that 
American ratification would become binding only after three 
of the four principle Allied powers had accepted them in 
writing. The first reservation, concerning withdrawal, 
stated that the United States would be the sole judge of 
whether it had fulfilled its obligations, end provided 
further, as a limitation upon the executive in foreign 
affairs, that notice of withdrawal might be given by a
70F. M. Davenport, "What the Pacific Northwest Thinks 
about the League and the Treaty," Outlook. OZZTI (Aufoist 6. 
1919), 539.
fllodge, 178.
^^Fleming, 392-3.
73W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate 
(Baltimore, 1933), 295.
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concurrent resolution of Congress. A concurrent resolution, 
of course, does not require the president’s signature, nor 
can it be nullified by his veto. The second reservation 
dealt with the ever-controversial Article 10, This reser­
vation stipulated that no obligation would be assumed by 
the United States in preserving the territorial integrity 
or political Independence of any nation, nor would the 
United States employ its military or naval forces for such 
a purpose without consent of Congress, The fourth reserved 
to the United States the right to Judge what were domestic 
questions; the fifth made the United States the sole inter­
preter of the Monroe Doctrine; end the sixth declared that 
the United states withheld its assent to the Shantung 
settlement. Reservations seven to thirteen were of minor 
importance in that they had little effect upon the opera­
tion of the League Itself, although the tenth practically 
reserved to the United states full liberty of action in 
regard to the limitation of armaments. The fourteenth and 
last reservation dealt with the voting power of Great 
Britain in the Assembly, It stated that the United States 
would not be bound by any decision of the League when a
member, along with its parts of empire, had cast more than
^ 74one vote.
The Republicans who rejected the textual amendments
74For a full text of the Lodge reservations, see 
Bailey, The Great Betrayal, 387-92,
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were the mild reservatlonlsts.^® The difference between the
mild reservatlonlsts and their stronger brethren, politically,
was that the latter hoped for actual amendments to the treaty
and that they demanded that these changes be formally eo-
76cepted by the other powers. The mild reservatlonlsts, 
however, were those who believed that reservations of a 
more Innocuous sort might be necessary, and they therefore 
attempted, at first, to coalesce with the Democrats, Inas­
much as Wilson bad declared his willingness to accept reser­
vations of an interpretive character which did not require
77the assent of the other powers. McNary, MeCumber end others 
of this small group favored reservations of an Interpretive 
nature or such Issues as withdrawal. Article 10, domestic 
questions and the Monroe Doctrine. Their purpose was to 
"hold a balance of power that would compel one or both of 
these groups f_ Democrats end strong reservatlonlsts^ to 
modify its position."^® By such a coalition they could have 
defeated the Lodge reservations, to leave the remaining 
Republicans with the painful choice of either accepting
79these mild reservations or defeating the treaty outright.
?®Ibld.. 154. 
fGjbld.. 56-57.
??Ibld.. 170.
^^Flemlng, 297.
?9#alley, the Great Betrayal. 53.
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But by mld-jâugust of 1919, Wilson suddenly reversed 
his attitude end declared that even Interpretive reservations 
eould not be accepted. Thus the mild reservatlonlsts, Im­
pelled by party or other considerations, were driven into 
the arms of Lodge, and all the stronger reservations which
his group presented became, by the votes of all the Repub-
80llcans, binding upon the treaty.
The mild reservatlonlsts defeated the textual amend­
ments In November, but reservatlonlsts of all shades became, 
for all intents and purposes, of one camp. In spite of the 
marked friendship of the milder group for the treaty.
Senator MoCumber was the only Republican ever to vote for 
It without reservations, — !
The treaty was voted upon for the first time on 
November 19, 1919. The first resolution was for ratifica­
tion with the reservations attached. It was defeated by a 
vote of 55 nays to 39 yeas. Five Ndrthwest senators, all 
Republicans end reservatlonlsts, voted yea. These were 
Jones of Washington, Me Cumber of North Dakota, sterling of 
South Dakota, McNary of Oregon and Warren of Wyoming. Those 
who rejected It because of the reservations were the Demo­
crats Walsh and Myers of Montana, Nugent of Idaho end 
Johnson of South Dakota. The remaining Republicans, the 
Irreconcllables Borah of Idaho, Poindexter of Washington
®°Ibld.. 171, 
®^nemlng, 396.
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ooand Gronna of North Dakota, all voted nay. Following this 
action a reconsideration was proposed and passed. Again 
even a majority failed to respond. All the northwest sena­
tors voted as before except Myers, who voted yea, hoping
perhaps that enough others might follow suit to ratify the 
03treaty. Finally a vote was taken on the treaty without 
reservations. When it was defeated this time the irrecon- 
cilables voted nay, as always, along with all the Republicans 
except McCumber, who joined with the Democrats in supporting 
I t/'
Because of public indignation over this apparently
unnecessary defeat, compromise negotiations were entered
into in January, 1920. A bipartisan conference composed of
Lodge and other Republicans, plus some Democrats, including
Walsh, attempted to reach an agreement on several issues,
85especially on the reservation to Article 10. Wilson held
this article to be the "heart of the Covenant" and the
"essence of Americanism," and therefore was opposed to any
86reservation which would weaken it. The enemies of Article 
10, of course, pictured it as a breeder of wars and a vexa­
tious obligation. This conference, however, reached no real
8786.
Q^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 session, LVIII,
I
Q^Ibid.. 8802.
®^Ibld., 6803.
^%8iley. The Great Betrayal. 299ff.
®^Fleming, 436-7.
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conclusion. About the time some kind of agreement seemed to 
be in the offing, Senator Lodge was awakened from his com­
promising slumbers by an almost violent intimidation by
Borah and a few other irreconcllables, and thenceforth the
87efforts of the conference waned. One of the few agree­
ments reached was that the other powers, in accepting 
American entrance in the League with reservations could 
do so by silence or acquiescence instead of by formal 
notice.®®
The treaty was considered for the last time on March
19, 1920, The reservations were altered somewhat and again
89they received their heaviest support by Republican votes.
At this time also, a fifteenth reservation was added which 
would grant self-determination for Ireland. This reserva­
tion, however, was a Democratic strategem; the purpose
was, if possible, to render the body of reservations too
90offensive even for the Republicans to stomach.
On March 19 the treaty with reservations was defeated 
by a vote of 49 for and 35 against (a majority in this case 
favored it). Wilson had notified his Democratic colleagues 
in the senate that rejection of the treaty with reservations
®?Bailey, The Great Betrayal.
Jessup, 408.
Stull Holt, 295.
®^Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 263-4.
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91iras the proper thing. Were it not for this, enough Demo­
crats might have swung over (there need only have been seven) 
and ratified the t r e a t y . S e n a t o r  Walsh, just before the 
votes were cast, made an impressive speech, urging that he,
88 a Democrat, intended to vote for the reservations, simply
93because the treaty would pass that way or never.
Walsh, Nugent and layers all decided, as did many
other Democrats, to ignore the President’s plea end vote
with the Republicans. Johnson of South Dakota, however,
was one of the three Democratic senators north of the Mason
and Diion line to stand loyally and futilely by Wilson on 
94this vote. After this date, the treaty was not again con­
sidered by the Senate.
In 1920 the country had returned to its internal 
economic preoccupations. The people were apathetic 
toward international questions and exasperated at the 
long-drawn-out bickerings which had brought the settle­
ment of peace to an Inconclusive deadlock. "Normalcy" 
and the emergence from post-war economic crises were 
uppermost in the national mind. In accordance with 
such impressions and circumstances the two parties 
made up their electoral platforms.’^
The Democratic party promised ratification of the 
treaty (though not without reservations) and the Republicans
®^Balley, Diplomatic History. 677.
^^Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 267.
^^Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 2 Session, 
LII, 4581.
94Ibid.. 4599.
®%owland, 294-6.
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Inserted a plank, visible enough to please those who favored 
the League and ambiguous enough to hold duch as Borah and 
others in the ranks. But the League of Nations no longer 
occupied a primary place in the national political con-
96sciousness. In the landslide of 1920, this was clearly
indicated. The Republican victory was a crushing defeat
for everything for which the Wilson government bad stood.
In the entire Northwest, which shared the sentiments of
the greater part of the nation, only a single county
97(Mineral, Montana) polled a Democratic majority.
S^Ibid.. 294-6.
9?Edger Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote. 
1896-1932 (Stanford University Press, 1934), 20.
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CHAPTEH I I  
IRKECOKCILABLiîS
The "Mlrebeau of the Battalion of Death," as Borah was 
called by some of his associates,^ believed that American re­
jection of the League of Rations was the greatest decision in 
foreign affairs since the "promulgation of the îâonroe Doc­
trine," and among all those figures who fought for this
rejection Borah, "more then any other man stirred up anti-
2League sentiment among the people."
He was the original irreoonsllable. When other 
leaders were discussing the desirability of separating 
the Covenant of the League from the Treaty, or urging 
the necessity of "Americanizing" it, Borah was saying 
he would have none of it. • • B)rah brought the 
lawyer's skill in exposing the flaws end jokers in 
a document, the orator's superb, exalted eloquence, 
and the patriot's sincere convictions to the side of 
the opposition. Impelled by little or no consideration 
for partisan advantage, he brought dignity end, at 
times, magnificence to an opposition which had little 
of the former and none of the latter.*
Like Gronna and Poindexter be was a nationalist and an iso­
lationist, but he defended his convictions with a sincerity 
so deep and so personal, that he remained, among all the others, 
the sole opponent of the League who retained Wilson's respect 
to the end. This in itself exempts him from any charge of 
a partisan spirit, if not from error.
^Johnson, 223ff. 
^Ibid.. 223.
Sibid.. 223.
4lbld.. 223-4, 255.
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Borah, believed, for what to him were sound reesons, 
that participation in the League of Nations was the worst 
possible step which the United States ever could take; end 
long before the League of Nations became any kind of 
political issue in the United states, Borah sensed that 
this country was entering upon a path of departure from 
what he thought was the only possible course in keeping 
with the safety and welfare of its best traditions and 
Institutions. Therefore, in April, 1917, when war was 
declared upon Germany, Borah gave no unconditional support 
to that declaration. He wished it to be clearly understood 
that the war which we were about to enter was, above all, 
caused by the German violation of American neutral rights.
He maintained that the European war was no concern of ours, 
end that the United States had done everything within the 
limits of honor and self respect to remain neutral. He 
believed that ours was an American war to protect American 
rights, honor and security, and that beyond that the United
5States could not commit itself. In a few terse phrases, 
he stated the position by which he was to stand through
thick and thin for a good many months to come:
I join no crusade; I seek or accept no alliances; I 
obligate this country to no other power. I make war 
alone for my countrymen and their rights, for my country 
and its honor.^
^Congressional Record. 65 Congress , 1 Session, 
LV, 252-3.
^Ibid.. 253.
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Also, In January end April of 1917, and In December,
1918, when the war had Just ended, Borah offered spirited
resolutions that the United States reaffirm its faith and
confidence in the Monroe Doctrine and in the policies laid
7down by Washington and Jefferson.
In his speeches against the League of Nations, Borah
had access to whet could be called a schoolboy’s knowledge
of history, which seemed to be entwined among all his basic
convictions. By this knowledge he could prove anything, at
least to his own satisfaction. His greatest asset, however,
which made him a formidable opponent on the floor, was his
oratorical skill; for as seen, perhaps, by others,
. . .it would be difficult to ejgpe with a man who felt 
as strongly about it /the League/ as that, and who could 
express his hatred of the idea so effectively. . . . 
Probably few Senators cared to undertake it spontan­
eously.®
He had a peculiar distrust for any kind of inter­
nationalism, and a phobia for anything foreign, especially 
European:
It is his belief in American democracy, American freedom. 
This democracy is peculiar to ourselves and we must work 
it out alone. Croing into an international combination 
might level it down, contaminate it, besmirch it. His 
nationalism is built upon his belief in the sufficiency 
of American democracy.
^Congressional Record. 64 Congress, 2 Session, LIV, 
1950; Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 1 Session, LV, 440; 
Congressional Record, 65 Congress, 3 Session, LVII, 124.
^Fleming, 95.
^Johnson, 255.
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Borah also had a very strong reverence for the great 
men of his country. Throughout his speeches in the Senate, 
his references to the policies and characters of the Founding 
Fathers recur with monotonous frequency. The United States 
seemed to him to be the culmination of a centuries-old and 
arduous strife for freedom, and to him the immutable prin­
ciples as laid down in the Declaration of Independence and 
the Bill of nights found their highest expression in the 
hallowed utterances of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln.
According to Borah, the war from which the United 
States had just emerged was one between two forms of 
government. One of these was the embodiment of the lîagna 
Charts, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, 
the Constitution of the United States and the "principles of 
human liberty which they embody and preserve." The other 
was an autocratic, war-hungry state, a "remorseless and 
soulless" institution which never yielded to the hopes end 
aspirations of the masses. The war was another phase of 
the old struggle of liberty against power which man had 
so valiantly carried on from Llarathon to Verdun. History, 
to Borah, was marked by many such struggles for the 
principles of liberty and justice— Charles Kartell at 
Tours, the Allies at Waterloo, Washington at Valley Forge, 
and Lincoln at Chancellorsv i l l e . The World War was
^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 2 session, 
LVI, 3655-6.
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fought for these prinelples~it was a contest between the
principles of the Hohenzollerns and the faith of Abraham
Lincoln. He believed that
the most priceless heritage which this war will leave to 
a war-torn and weary world is the demonstrated fact that 
a free people of a free government can make war success­
fully and triumphantly, can defy and defeat militarism 
and preserve throughout all their independence, their 
freedom and the integrity of their institutions.H
Such was Borah's nationalism, and between him and those 
who advocated American membership in the League of Nations or 
any other form of international tribunal, there existed a 
gulf which nothing could span.
Throughout his more characteristic speeches, Borah 
appealed as much to the ideological principles involved as 
he did to the legal flaws in the Covenant— to the shameful 
sacrifices which the United States would necessarily make 
by participation in the League. The Monroe Doctrine, he 
said, had been "thrown up as a dyke against the threatened 
flood of foul inundation" of our own league of nations—  
that of the free nations of the Western Hemisphere. "It 
was the new Republic's bold challenge to this unconscionable 
conspiracy /the Holy Alliance/ bent upon the destruction of 
frjÊB governments," and it was the Monroe Doctrine that the 
League of Nations would d e s t r o y . I t  was also Borah's
lllbid.. 3655-6.
12c
LVII, 1957
^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 Session,
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contention that the recent and glorious victory over a
"trained, brutal militarism" was attained by the love of
the frenchman for his country, the love of the Briton for
his country, end the American’s love for his, and it was
this love of country, this patriotism which was so neces-
13sary, that internationalism would kill.
But when it came to the fate of his own country,
Borah’s attitude was yet less detached;
. .God pity the ideals of this Republic if they 
shall have no defenders save the gathered scum of the 
nations organized into a conglomerate international 
police force, ordered hither and thither by the most 
heterogeneous and irresponsible body or court that 
ever confused or confounded the natural instincts and 
noble passions of a p e o p l e .
Borah thus often compared the high principles and in­
stitutions of the American system with the pernicious and 
evil ways of the Old world. Nor did he hesitate, in spite 
of admitted virtues in many cases, to magnify the "untrust­
worthy” practices of the other nations. The League of 
Nations, for example, he considered to be a triumph for 
British diplomacy, since Britain had surrendered utterly 
nothing at the peace conference. The British umpire, 
specifically, had managed to attain six votes in the 
Assembly compared to the one granted the United atates, 
and the fact that there was to be no abrogation of the 
secret treaties which had been concluded during the war
ISlbid.. 1387. 
^^Ibid.. 1387.
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between Britain, France and Italy, meant that the other na­
tions had also Joined in a conspiracy against us.^®
But the United States, lamented Borah, had surrendered 
almost its all— it had surrendered the traditional foreign 
policy of one hundred years end had placed its man power, 
its finances and its sovereignty at the disposal of foreign 
powers for the purpose of guarding the Integrity of their 
possessions the world over.^^
True to his equalitarianism, Borah pointed to Ireland, 
and claimed that, even though she would perhaps not receive 
her independence soon, she would never receive it under the 
League of Nations, as such a thing would be prevented by 
Articles 10, 11, and 16 of the Covenent,^^ y/hen the Irish 
reservation was voted upon in March, 1920, Borah supported 
it because to him it signified the Senate’s recognition of 
the noble principle of self-determination. But even if 
Ireland did receive her freedom, he maintained, and were 
admitted to the League, she would be worse off under that
combination than she had been for the past seven-hundred 
18years.
^^Ibid.. 3914-15.
^^Ibid.. 3914-15.
Congressione1 Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 2078. Article 16 provided for various types of 
police action, military and economic, to be used against 
covenant?breaking states.
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, 
LIÏ, 4507.
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Likewise did he attack the injustice of the Shantung
settlement and the expectation that the United States would
assent to such a wrong by ratification of the treaty.
And bringing the matter home, he displayed his westerner's
distrust of big business by pointing out that the ”inordlnate"
desire for ratification without debate or consideration was
20merely the concerted effort of wall Street.
Finally, said Borah, if the United States intended to
ratify the treaty, there was only one just and proper way to
do it— by taking the matter directly to the people, to the
man in the street, the field, in the common walks of life.
The policy of George Washington, which the United states
had followed for so many decades, was superior '♦even to the
will of the people of the United States represented in
Congress acting under the Constitution,” and until that
policy was repudiated by the people themselves, by the _
sovereign will of the people of the United States, Congress
21had no moral right to do otherwise than observe it.
Inspired by these strong feelings, Borah used his 
lawyer's skill to tear the treaty limb from limb, and bring 
to the surface what were to him pernicious provisions.
^^Congressional Record, 66 Congress. 1 Session,
LVIII, 4439.
^^Ibld.. 2062. Thomas W. Lamont of the House of 
Morgan had shown a premature publication of the treaty to 
Senator Lodge. Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 4; Jessup, 397-8,
21 Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, LIX, 
2694-5. This quotation ip from Senator Lenroot (Rep., 111.) 
who questioned Borah on this subject.
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Obligations and subtle dangers contained in that document*
Article 8, which dealt with disarmament, he claimed to be
very hazy and providing for no positive plan, which was just
22the way the Europeans had designed it* Furthermore, he 
d«nanded, how could disarmament ever be effective with 
"article 10 and article 11 staring us in the face day by 
dayi"^^ And was the United States to guard the territorial 
integrity of nations by taking the advice of "five or nine 
men sitting at Geneva as to how we shall perform our obli­
gations under article 10?" Under this article every local 
war would Immediately flare into a "world conflict.
And even though the Council*s decisions were solely of an 
advisory nature, the United States would be under the
"highest moral obligation to accept the advice of the
25council," and to repudiate it would be dishonorable*
Again speaking of disarmament, Borah stated such
would be impossible under the "war-artid e s , "— 10, 11,
26and 16* And Article 11, he claimed, was stronger and 
even "more latitudinous than the terms of the Holy Alliance,"
LVIII, 1738. 
23
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
Ibid*. 1741. 
^^Ibid*. 1743* 
25ibid*. 1747. 
^^Ibid*. 1748*
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because it gave the League power to suppress an Insurreo- 
27tlon. Moreover, Articles 10 end 11 together gave the 
League jurisdiction over "every conceivable disturbance
which may be interpreted as war or threat of war, end it
2Sis immaterial whether it is internal or external."
Concerning the voting power of the British Empire in
the Assembly, Borah pointed to the dual role of the dominions.
They were morally bound and obligated, he said, to the Mother
Country, and there was at the same time no provision which
prevented them all from sometime becoming members of the 
29Council. But even considering the fact that Britain was 
limited in her powers in the League by only holding one vote 
In the Council, the United States, he said, had yet lost.
The United States yielded on the freedom of the aeas, on 
the secret treaties, on the protectorate of Egypt and on 
Irish independence. Then it had to take a subordinate 
position on the Assembly and yield its "equality of pres­
tige, equality of moral and intellectual power, equality 
of dignity and honor."®®
Borah's opposition to the League was relentless and 
uncompromising. For him nothing was commendable about the 
League nor could anything bad enough be said of it. His
"̂̂ Ibid.. 2080. 
^Qlbid.. 5935.
^®IMd., 7496.
®®Ibid., 7325.
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hatred end fear of such an Instrument had a strength that 
nothing could break. When the treaty was defeated in 
November, 1919, Borah announced that the killing of it was 
the greatest thing the Senate had ever done, end for this 
noble action, the Senate was "entitled to the gratitude of 
the .American people for all time to come," even if it 
should do nothing else.^l
Senator Poindexter was very prominent in the Repub­
lican party in 1919, but he differed from Borah in several 
respects. He was noticeably less sincere in his opposition 
to the League, and at times he betrayed a rather partisan 
attitude. In 1918, for example, he bitterly assailed Wilson 
for his request for a Democratic Congress on the ground that 
Wilson wanted a rubber stamp for his policies (which charge, 
however, did not lack validity), end on the ground that 
Wilson was desirous of an easy defeat for the "good German 
E m p i r e . A n d  as a prospective candidate for the presi­
dency in 1920, he also revealed a rather reactionary spirit. 
The League of Nations at that time had not yet seen its 
final defeat. Poindexter went to some length to list the 
"errors" of the Democratic Administration, and prescribed 
such Republican measures for a "wise economy" as reduced
31Congressional Record. 66 Congress. 2 Session.
LIX, 403.
^^Congressional Record, 65 Congress, 2 session, 
LVI, 11501-2.
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taxes upon industry and consumption, and a supplement in the 
form of a higher tariff wall. He also found reason to pro­
pose the employment of the United States Navy for the en­
forcement of all "radio communication between the United 
States and the rest of the world." He declared that peace 
should be immediately concluded and that the treaty of peace 
should be "stripped of all extraneous incumbrances. . ." 
meaning, of course, the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Rirthermore, he urged, the United states should cease
meddling in the affairs of the other nations and the Monroe
33Doctrine should be firmly reestablished,
Poindexter was the first senator to speak on the 
Covenant after the first draft had been published in American 
newspapers. Before that time, however, he did venture a few 
remarks. In December, 1918, he argued that, since the United 
States and Great Britain had settled boundary disputes with­
out war, what was the purpose of a league of nations when 
such disputes could be settled so easily?^^
Six weeks later, he maintained that the Europeans did 
not really want the United States to belong to a league of 
nations. He claimed that those countries resented our inter­
ference in their affairs just as we would resent their
^^William de Wagstaffe, "What Poindexter Stands For," 
Forum. LZIII (February, 1920), 197-204,
^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 Session,
LVII, 181.
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meddling in the affairs of the Western Eemisphere. There was 
in existence, or could be, he said, the greatest of all lea­
gues of nations* This was the allied and associated powers 
which had just defeated Germany in a great "enforcement of 
peace*" The United States should advocate, instead of a 
supergovernment, an aesociation of nations based upon good 
will and common sense.®®
Poindexter*8 longest attack on the League was made 
on February 19, 1919, before the Covenant had been revised 
and in open defiance of Wilson’s request that debates be 
withheld until he returned from France. The question to be 
decided, said Poindexter, was whether the United States should 
adhere to the principles of Washington and Monroe, while 
maintaining friendly relations with all nations, or whether 
it should ensnare itself in the most entangling alliance 
conceivable* Would we promote peace or war, he wondered, 
by requiring that each nation meddle in the affairs of
•ZAOthers? Reviewing the examplary character of the United 
States, he continued:
There is no other citizenship in the world so en­
tirely free of class distinction or discrimination as 
that of the American people. There is no other nation 
which to day is more absolutely sovereign than the 
United States. There is no other nation where an 
individual citizen, standing upon an absolute legal 
and governmental equality with every other citizen, 
wields an equal voice in determining the highest 
prerogatives of government. . . .  The question now
^^Ibid.. 1803. 
®®Ibid*. 3747.
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presented Is whether or not the high sovereign Juris­
diction of the political heirs of Jefferson, Washington 
and Lincoln is to be in part surrendered and subjected 
to the control of strangers and aliens.'^”
In reference to several specific provisions, Poindexter 
claimed that the League of Nations bound mankind forever.
There was no provision for withdrawal, end each nation would 
surrender its sovereign right to regulate the rules, methods 
and degree of disarmament. Furthermore, he claimed, arbitra­
tion would be compulsory for questions of every description, 
and each nation would be committed to fight wars at any 
time and at any place deemed necessary. And also, as dis­
armament would be confined to the member nations, a non- 
member with a large military force would, by virtue of the
weaker forces of the members, be strongly tempted toward 
38conquest.
Poindexter further reminded that, if the United states 
should Join the League of Nations, the people would do so 
with the understanding that they would live up to their word. 
Therefore, he maintained, if the Senate should ratify the 
treaty, and the United States should feel unwilling in the 
future to accept any of the League's decisions, the only 
avenue of escape would be dishonor. Moreover, he argued, 
the constitution of the League was an "alien tribunal," and 
American participation would mean the 'delegation of powers 
of the government of the United States to another power."
5?Ibid.. 3747. 
38ibld.. 3748-0.
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Also, if the United States dared Ignore the mandates of this
organization, it would find itself at war with all the other
. 39members.
Again, Poindexter repeated, a league of nations was 
not necessary. The United States, for example, had preserved 
peace in Eaiti, San Domingo and Honduras, and had taken Vera 
Cruz and made war upon Villa without one. Furthermore, If 
the civilized nations of the world, organized as they had 
been, could not perpetuate the peace, a league to enforce 
such a peace would obviously fail. In fact, said Poindexter, 
with all the complexities and obligations which a lea#ie 
would create, the occasions for war would only multiply,
A league of nations would be nothing more than a "fertile 
seed of war," and the expenses and sacrifices of all kinds 
which would accrue under such a thing would be beyond cal­
culation. And worse yet, the damage done to the "spirit 
of our government. . ./would be/. • .far more sinister than 
the losses which we will inevitably suffer in men and money." 
Despotic internationalism should never be permitted to under-
40mine the principles of local government and self-determination.
During this sweeping attack on the League of Nations, 
Poindexter struck a note of questionable wisdom when pointing, 
no doubt, to Wilson the Virginian and the Southern Democrats
5*Ibld.. 3750. 
^ I b i d .. 3752-3.
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In the Senate, he said:
It Is a curious clrcxuustance. . .that the South. . • 
which failed in Its great effort for Independence In 
1865, having obtained control of the Government of the 
Union, now is about to achieve the sardonic triumph of 
depriving the North of its independence and setting up 
over it a supergovernment. The North conquered the 
South by force of arms; the South now seems to be in 
a fair way of conquering the North by a diplomatic 
surrender of its liberties. The South, having fought 
the most heroic war, in many respects, in history, and 
having lost and been subjected to the domination of the 
North, now apparently has no objection to go still fur­
ther and subject both the South and the North to the 
control of an international government
After the Covenant had been revised, Poindexter's
attitude remained very much the same. In Article 15 of the
Covenant there is a section by which disputes may be referred
to the Assembly. Forgetting the facility with which boundary
disputes had been settled between the United states end Great
Britain, he reminded the Senate that, by this article, it
would be a simple process for a foreign country. Greet
Britain, for example, to lay claim to four counties in the
State of Maine. And if the friends of Great Britain on the
Assembly should decide that she had a valid claim to these
four counties, the decision of that body would stand as the
42final adjudication of the question.
Poindexter could not understand the president's re­
mark that Article 10 was the "heart of the Covenant." If
41lbid.. 3754.
^^Conffressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, LVIII, 
8588. The same thing could be said of the "friends of Great 
Britain" on the Council, but in this section of Article 15 
the principle of unanimity does not necessarily hold. See 
for example Lodge, 393-4.
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the Covenant were adopted, he claimed, we could expect no more
success in preserving the territorial integrity of e nation
than was attained by the Belgian neutrality pact of 1831,
whose language was stronger even than that of Article 10
in the present agreement. And, continued Poindexter, the
President himself was rather inconsistent. In 1914, the
United States could have "assumed the obligations embodied
in the present article 10, . but Wilson at that time
deemed the European crisis to be no concern of ours. Now,
however, the President had changed his mind. He expected
that the United States should obligate itself in advance
"under all circumstances without the opportunity to deter-
43mine whether the emergency justifies it or not. . ."
Senator Poindexter may be remembered for e bit of
ringing Americanism of his own: If the United States should
join the League of Nations, it would surrender all it had
fought for. This country, of course, never fought unless
it had to, but it should certainly not surrender the right.
Like the proverbial Irishman who had to fight for his black
eyes, the United states should likewise reserve the right
to fight for what was its own. It should not join a league
of nations and depend upon the kindness of Canada, Haiti
44and Panama to take care of it.
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, LIX,
4122-3.
**Ibld.. 4124.
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Senator Gronna had been an Isolationist and a pacifist 
during the war, and it was these baaio sympathies which most 
likely caused him to oppose the League of Nations. He be­
lieved that, had the United States taken a firm stand against 
the murder of American citizens, as in the case of the
Lusitania, war between the United states and the Central
45Powers could have been averted, Furthermore, he believed
that the Wilson Administration, which appealed for support
in 1916 to keep the United States out of the conflict, had
changed over night and become, instead of "angels of peace,"
46advocates of war. And because he believed that the American
people had not been sufficiently informed as to the exigencies
and policies which led them into the war, he chose, in 1917,
47to vote against that declaration. It was also significant, 
he said, that those very senators who were at the present 
time clamoring for a peace through the ratification of the 
Covenant had been, in 1917, clamoring for war. Actually, he 
said, those senators knew as well as he did that the Covenant 
could never perpetuate the peace, simply because it was not
A Qbased upon the principles of equality and justice.
45Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 7420.
^^Ibid.. 7420.
47Ibid.. 7420.
48ibid.. 7420.
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Aside from the "Shantung robbery," Gronna had no ob­
jections to the treaty of peace. W t  he opposed the League 
Covenant wholeheartedly, and undertook to analyse this in­
strument article by article:
In spite of a provision in Article 1 for withdrawal, 
such a thing might well be impossible, because forelgn- 
ifflposed obligations might be of a sort to render their 
fulfillment impossible. The language in Article 3, which 
stated that the Assembly could deal with any matter "within 
the sphere of the League," was so vague that domestic ques­
tions might easily come within the sphere of the League's 
operations. Such things as immigration, religion and morals 
might be open to foreign jurisdiction. By Article 4, Great 
Britain, with her votes in the Assembly could increase her 
membership at will. Referring to Article 6, Gronna pointed 
out that unanimous concurrence would not always protect the 
United states from the designs of foreign nations because, 
as provided in Article 15, a dispute involving this country 
would exclude it from voting in the Council. Moreover, in 
Article 6, the Council was given the power to decide upon 
the limitation of armaments among the various nations, and 
therefore this "supergovernment" would have the authority 
to demand reports on industries, foods and munitions. By 
Article 10, the United States would be both morally and 
legally bound to go to war whemever and wherever the Council 
should so decide. And by Article 11, which would similarly 
place this country at the mercy of the Council for fighting
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wars all over the world, the League would also have the power
to interfere in all the affairs of every nation. In Article
15, it was left up to the Council to decide the nature of
domestic questions, end finally, the Monroe Doctrine clause
in Article 21 waa an impertinence. The Monroe Doctrine was
an American policy, end not an international agreement, and
as such should not have been given to the interpretation of
49European governments.
Gronna announced that the provisions of the Covenant
had been laid down in accordance with Wilson's Fourteen
Points, he would have approved of it. Had the principle
of "open covenants of peace openly arrived at" been adhered
to at the peace conference, the "Shantung robbery" would
never have been condoned, and the United'States would not
have had to approve the "wrong dona in 1893 and approve the
secret treaty made by Japan during the recent war when she
threatened to overpower the Chinese people unless these con-
50cessions were made."
Unless the Americans could agree, therefore, that 
all the President's war-time addresses, including the Four­
teen Points, should "ipso facto become a portion of the 
covenant of the treaty," it would have to be conceded, said 
Gronna, that the principles of the President, at one time
49ibid.. 7421-6. 
SOlbld.. 7426.
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so humans, had been abandoned. When the President, in his
Fourteen Points, demanded that Russia be allowed to determine
her own political and national policies, he should also have
included Ireland, Finlbnd, India, or any other oppressed
nation. We could not tell any liberty-loving people that
we were "carrying out our pledge in good faith," when, in
fact we proposed to set up over them a super-state, governed 
51by a very few.
Senator Gronna announced, proudly, that he was "born 
on American soil," but that his parents were from Norway, 
and that he was not ashamed of being descended from that 
splendid people. They loved liberty and they compared favor­
ably with the people of any other nation of the world. He 
was aware, of course, that the other senators present were 
not interested in Scandinavian history, but he none the less 
embarked upon a lengthy description of that area, beginning 
with earliest times. He pointed out, by a number of in­
volved examples, that even people who are of the same racial 
stock and religious belief cannot without great difficulty 
come to terms on all matters "without dissension and troubles 
which may lead to war." He made a happy exception, of course, 
when he added that this situation did not apply to America, 
for any person who came to this land relinquished all that 
was inimical to American citizenship. And if that person
Sllbid.. 7427.
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was not willing to do so, he was "not worthy of the splendid
opportunity of becoming a citizen of this great land— *the
52land of the free and the home of the breve.*"
Gronna then chose to transcent himself end remind 
everyone that
some four thousand years ago, when there was but one 
language in the world, and the earth was of one speech, 
the generations of Roah undertook to perpetuate this 
condition, and in order to do so they attempted on 
the plain of Shiner to construct a great building in 
the form of a tower. Undoubtedly this was done in the 
very best of intentions, as it may be with the best of 
intentions that the league is advocated by its pro­
ponents who profess that it will promote peace. The 
people of that day wanted to build a monument so high 
that it might reach into heaven. They wanted to 
assume a certain name lest they be scattered abroad 
over the face of the whole earth; but we are also told
that the Lord came down to see the city which the
children of men builded, and the Lord said—
Behold the people is one.
He recognized that they were one.®^
Therefore, continued Gronna, the Lord confounded the
languages of the people so that they were confused and could
not understand each other. Since that day the people have
been scattered all over the face of the earth. It was deemed
by one Mighty Power that one people and one language was an
unwise thing. God did not want man's individuality to be
lost, and now, with all the nationalities on earth, a union
of them would be as difficult as the construction of the Tower
of Babel.
52ibid.. 7427-8. 
GSlbld.. 7427. 
G^ibid.. 7427.
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Gronna conceded that the League of Nations, if com­
posed of men of altruistic Ideals, might become a "power for 
good," But if its members were otherwise, the League would 
be just as powerful as an instrument of injustice and oppres­
sion, with the probable result of endless wars, "wars which 
could not cease until this supergovernment was destroyed."55
Gronna reiterated his final position by saying that 
the American soldiers, living and dead, had always uppermost 
in their minds the protection of the United States from a 
foreign foe and the liberation of oppressed peoples. They 
had no desire to change the boundaries of Europe or elsewhere, 
or to guarantee the territorial integrity of "all the nations 
of the earth." Ho could not, therefore, approve of this 
treaty.
1Senators Borah, Poindexter and Gronna had one aim in 
common— the absolute defeat of the League of Nations. With 
regard to the Covenant as a legal instrument or international 
constitution, their views were likewise similar. Each was 
convinced, or pretended to be, that the League of Nations 
was little more than a war contract, especially when it 
contained such things as Article 10. Each had a marked dis­
trust for the fidelity or policies of foreign nations, es­
pecially Great Britain, and each also was jealously watchful
55ibid.. 7427. 
5*Ibid., 7430,
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of anything which he believed would infringe upon American
euperlority, especially in the Western Hemisphere* Because
of these feelings, each gave his support to all the Lodge
reservations, obviously in an attempt to render the thing as
57innocuous as possible in the event that it did pass.
But otherwise, there were essential differences among 
these men. Poindexter revealed a rather vindictive spirit, 
and it would appear to him that the League was but an enemy 
made to order. Gronna was most likely sincere in his opposi­
tion, although lacking in the forcefulness of the other two. 
Borah, however, stood alone. Whatever might be said about 
his views on the League question, be none the less defended 
his convictions with an honesty that could not be refuted.
To'What extent the declamations of these senators influenced 
public opinion is difficult to say, but if it is true that 
Borah's influence was the strongest in cooling popular sen­
timent, it is not difficult to see why.
^^Borah, for example, once said that there was "little 
doubt that sooner or later. . .the treaty will be ratified 
with the league of nations in it." Congressional Record,
66 Congress, 1 Session, LVIII, 8781.
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CHAPTER III 
STRONG RESERVATIONISTS
The strong reserTstionists from the Northwest followed 
Senator Lodge. These were Thomas Sterling of South Dakota, 
Francis E. Warren of Wyoming and Wesley Jones of Washington. 
They supported practically all the Lodge reservations and two 
of them, Warren and sterling, were among the thirty-nine 
senators who signed the Round Robin in the early days of the 
controversy.^ They were not opposed to ratification of the 
treaty, but they were willing to do so only when they were 
sure, among other things, that certain American interests were 
adequately safeguarded and that the United states would at 
all times retain its sovereignty and independence of action.
These Northwest Senators were men of decided opinions. 
Their attitudes toward the League of Nations differed only 
slightly from those of such men as Borah, Gronna and Poin­
dexter. Rather than allow themselves to be transported by 
the promises of a peace which, to many, the League seemed to 
offer, they devoted most of their energies to admonitions 
against any action taken by the United states without due
^The only occasion on which a reservation did not re­
ceive the vote of any of these senators was when he was ab­
sent.
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Geutiozi and oiroumspeotlon.
The measure of partisan motivation is plainly apparent 
only in the oese of Jones. Sterling conceded that the Pres­
ident had been constitutionally justified in negotiating
the treaty Independently of and without interference by the
2Senate, and neither Sterling nor Warren mentioned the Pres­
ident in a manner indicative of a personal or political 
antagonism.
Jones, however, expended many words in flaying Wilson 
on several counts. In fact It is evident that much of his 
opposition was partisan in spirit and, at times, almost per­
sonal. So strong were his attacks on Wilson and on the 
Covenant that his votes in favor of the latter might have 
come as a surprise to anyone who had been familiar with the 
more spirited phases of his denunciations.
In any event, these three senators were apparently 
satisfied with the League Covenant after it had been packed 
with reservations sufficient in strength and number to satis­
fy their respective political sensibilities. Thomas Sterling, 
If not speaking for them all, none the less spoke sincerely 
and with an eye for the concrete, when he did choose to de­
fend the League of Nations and to protest America’s obliga­
tions to that organization.
If it was true, he said that the harsh terms which
^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 3 session, LVII,
1314.
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the peace conference had Imposed upon Germany and Austria
would produce disastrous economic results; and if, by
ratifying the treaty with the Lodge reservations to guard
American institutions, liberties and rights,
might we not. . .by becoming a member of the League of 
Sations, have a wholesome influence, a stabilizing and 
steadying effect upon the conditions there? Might not 
out counsel and our advice in a council of the League 
of Nations concerning the economic conditions of the 
European countries be worth while and help to mitigate 
some of the horrors which have been described?. , .
/We should not/ • . .resist the appeals of the desti­
tute and starving.*
The senator from Wyoming believed that because of the 
rapid rise of the United states to its high position in world 
leadership, such a position could not be called accidental. 
There was no doubt whatsoever, he maintained, that this 
American success was due almost solely to the American form 
of government. It had been attained by loyal adherence to 
the principles of self-government as laid down by the fathers 
and embodied in the Constitution. It was the result, he 
said, of undivided allegiance in past times to those pre­
cepts embodied in such monumental utterances as Washington's 
Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine and the Gettysburg 
Address, It was these fundamental truths and doctrines, 
that had so successfully guided us in the past, which should
4be applied at this time.
^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, 
LIZ, 2698-9.
^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 7064.
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Such, essentially, waa the attitude of Francis £• 
Warren, the champion of Americanism and apostle of the mean.
I cannot agree with the program outlined in a recent 
meeting of the communist party at Chicago to join with 
the Bolsheviki in an international plot to overthrow 
this Government and to supplant it with their own 
Utopian mesmerisms. Nor can I agree with the attitude 
of Mr. Gompers, when he recently said before a senate 
committee that if a law were passed to prevent railroad 
strikes he believed that the railroad unions would 
strike, regardless of law and order. I cannot agree 
with the Boston policemen who, in direct violation of 
their solemn oath to uphold the law deserted their 
posts and relinquished the city to the mercy of hood­
lums. I cannot agree with the President, who, in his 
recent Dea Moines speech, said that the league of na­
tions is bigger than the senate and greater than our 
government.5
The United States, Warren continued, should not subject 
itself as a vassal to an international organization. It 
should not discard its heritage. Our government, he main­
tained, should remain supreme "with the spirit and patriotism 
in which it was conceived and reared." Therefore the League 
of Nations should be Americanized in such a way that these 
principles would be recognized. Reservations should be adop­
ted which would preserve all those liberties which the 
American people had enjoyed since their independence. Other­
wise, the Liberty Bell, the Civil war, the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the blood spilled on the fields of France 
all would signify nothing.^ if the United states bad been 
the
®Ibld., 7064.
*Ibid.. 7064.
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altruistic Samsonian giant in the past it will surely 
be shorn of its copious looks by sacrificing its birth­
right to join the present league of nations.?
Senator Warren claimed that because of radical changes, 
Greece and Rome as well as many other governments had fallen.
We should not, therefore, listen to those "voices of the air" 
which would have us hastily adopt such a radical change as 
the League of Nations. We should keep in mind the teachings 
of the past while we weighed the problems which were before 
us at this time.®
Warren insisted that the patriotic sentiments of the 
men who favored the League could not, of course, be questioned, 
but these men had blindly followed its principles and had 
allowed themselves to be carried beyond the point of common 
sense. They had allowed themselves to be attracted, by 
visions and mirages, to "an extreme and radical position." 
Moderation, he believed, should remain the creed:
Be not the first by whom the new are tried.
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.
Examining the Covenant, Warren listed his several 
specific objections. The right of a people, he said, acting 
through Congress, "to approve or disapprove the sending forth 
of American soldiers to possible death has never been ques­
tioned." Yet, he continued, by Article 10, the breath of
?Ibid.. 7064.
®lbid.. 7064-5.
*As quoted by Warren, ibid., 7065.
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life was strangled from this principle. If the nation was
morally bound to do anything, then it followed that it was
also legally bound.
Also, he pointed out, if the United States wished to
withdraw, the League Council would be the deciding tribunal
when the question was raised whether we bad fulfilled our
obligations. Therefore, to place our power to withdraw in
the hands of others would be a relinquishment of our national
rights. And by Articles 11 and 12, this country would have
to submit any circumstance which threatened the peace among
nations to the Jurisdiction of the League. Such a provision,
he claimed, might cover many things, such as immigration
from the Orient, the regulation of taxes and foreign 
11commerce.
Moreover, Warren held that the Monroe Doctrine clause
was vague and uncertain, and that we should not submit this
historic document for interpretation "by the very people
against whom it was directed." Also, he said, the six votes
granted the British Empire in the Assembly was an injustice,
and the Shantung end Flume policies were likewise bad. we
should not acquiesce in these matters without some word of 
12protest.
lOlbid.. 7065. 
lllbid.. 7065.
l&The port of Flume was given to the newly created 
state of Yugoslavia. This incensed many Americans, who be­
lieved, or pretended to believe, that Italy had the rightful 
claim to this port. Fleming, 100-203.
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If the League Covenant In the fora then proposed would 
prevent war, and at the same time preserve American sovereignty], 
it would certainly have met with his, Warren*s, approval. But 
his opposition to it, he insisted, was not partisan. The 
issue was merely the broad question of Americanism,^^
In early 1919, before the first draft of the Covenant 
had been published, and before the debates on the League had 
gotten underway, Thomas Sterling expressed strong misgivings 
about the creation of a league of nations.
He maintained that the question was not whether we 
should have a league of nations, but whether we should have 
it at that time. It was a question whether its creation 
would consume the valuable time of the peace conference, 
the aim of which should be the immediate settlement of the 
issues which had arisen out of the recent war. As soon as 
was possible, he believed, the rights of the Allies and 
the obligations of the Central Powers should be deter­
mined.
Actually, sterling claimed, the relations and com­
mon purposes of the Allied nations constituted an almost 
perfect guarantee of a world peace. Moreover, as the es­
tablishment of a league to enforce such a peace would be
13Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 session, 
LVIII, 7065.
^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 session, 
LVII, 3607.
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fraught with insurmountable difficulties, the conference
should not be burdened or delayed with the consideration of
such a thing. The conclusion of a peace to mark the end of
the great war was the goal toward which ell the energies
15of the commission should be devoted,
%hen President Wilson praised the spirit of brother­
hood which had existed between Îranee and the United states, 
he shed light on a circumstance which, in Sterling’s eyes, 
made a league of nations unnecessary. This was true, he 
believed, because no such thing as an armed association of 
nations was needed between such closely united nations as 
these. At ell times the thoughts of the peoples of the two 
republics harked back to the beginnings which they had in 
common— to Washington and Franklin, to Lafayette end 
Roohambeau, and to the perils and sacrifices which they 
had shared in the riddance of this, the last end greatest 
threat to civilization and freedom. And such ties of friend­
ship also existed between.the United states and Great Bri­
tain. Because of mutual regard and suocessùl diplomacy
over the years, no dispute since 1814 had led to war be- 
16tween them.
sterling’s conviction was that this "trinity of 
nations"— the United states. Great Britain and France—  
would be united in peace and good understanding, for many
l^ibid.. 1314. 
IGibid.. 1314-15.
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17JBBTB to come, by the blood of their eons so freely shed.
Months later, after the treaty in its final form had 
been presented to the senate, the attitude of sterling 
slowly and imperceptibly evolved toward the acceptance of 
the ideas embodied in the League of Nations.
The President of the United States, he said, had been 
the most prominent figure in securing approval by the other 
nations of the original draft of the Covenant. And allegedly 
he had been opposed to any change in the first form and to 
any debates on the League in the senate until this consti­
tution (of the League) had been formally presented to that 
body. But, said Sterling, discussions on this subject 
could not be delayed. In fact, when the first draft was 
approved at the conference, it was the understanding that 
the work of the League of Nations committee at that junc­
ture was not to be adjudged as final. It was understood 
that the Covenant was to be the subject of criticism and
discussion, with a view to changes and amendments in those
X8particulars wherein criticism was just and reasonable.
Sterling believed that it was in this spirit of 
reasonable criticism that discussions went on in the Senate 
against the will of the President. There was a general 
sentiment, he said, in favor of some sort of league to
l?Ibid.. 1315.
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 3607.
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to prevent war and guarantee the peace of the world. But 
the questions of how a league of nations would affect our 
sovereignty, and to what degree the United States would 
have to depart from Its traditional policies, remained 
vague end indefinite. Hence the discussions which ensued 
were of great value in clearing up a number of these ob­
scurities. The American people, he recalled, were reminded 
of the deep concern of the founding fathers for the future 
welfare of the republic, end of the warnings against en­
tangling alliances. The people were reminded that, from 
the very beginning the United States had consistently ad­
hered to the principles of the fathers, and that in doing 
so the nation, in its material development and in the per­
manency of its institutions, had gained the admiration of 
the world. Therefore the people were reluctant, he said, 
to endorse the Covenant in its first form.19
But Sterling also wanted it understood after the 
Covenant had been revised, the average citizen should not 
be deceived by the claim that the prolonged opposition to 
the League was partisan or factious. Indeed, he said, the 
citizen was quite familiar with the "old landmarks"--the 
policies of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe— and because 
of his deep regard for these things, it was not surprising 
that the citizen himself strongly desired "safeguards
19lbid.. 3607, The first senator to "discuss" 
the League was Poindexter.
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against a policy so new and so opposed to that which he had
always believed In end cherished." JUnerioans were not at
this time opposed to the League of Nations, hut be pointed
out that the objections which had been raised with respect
to the original draft had not been met when the Covenant 
20was revised.
In examining the various provisions, senator Sterling 
noted that a provision had been inserted in the revised 
Covenant (in Article 1) which would allow the United States 
to withdraw from the League on two years notice, provided 
that Its international obligations and its obligations 
under the Covenant bad been fulfilled. But, he feared, to 
accept this provision would be a surrender of national 
sovereignty, because obligations to all the covenants which 
the United States had entered into since its independence 
would have to be fulfilled before it could withdraw from 
this supreme Covenant. American peace end safety, for ex­
ample, might be grounds for withdrawal, but because of this 
Impasse of unfulfilled obligations end obligations under 
the Covenant itself, all bound together by a strong chain 
of supergovernment. It would be impossible for the United 
States ever again to regain its freedom and sovereignty.^^
Ibid.. 3607-8. These remarks by Sterling were made 
in iiUgust, 1919, by which time the public seemed to favor 
ratification with reservations.
Zllbid.. 3608.
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Discussing the constitutionality of League membership, 
Sterling asserted that it was beyond the power of the senate 
or the Executive to negotiate a treaty which surrendered the 
power of the nation to judge for itself whether it had ful­
filled, or whether it should fullfill a treaty obligation.
If a foreign power should control or supervise the actions 
of the United States in regard to its international obli­
gations, how could it be said, he asked, that this was a 
sovereign state? Or if, by this restriction in Article 1, 
Congress could not abrogate a treaty which it considered 
burdensome, or with respect to which conditions bed altered, 
what difference would there be between that case end one by 
which the legislation of one nation, in respect to foreign 
affairs, was binding upon another? In either case, there 
would be a loss of the very crown of sovereignty— the right 
of a nation to direct for itself its international rela­
tions.^^
Sterling protested that those who endorsed the 
Covenant as it stood advanced the claim that a radical 
change was necessary in America»s existing political and 
international policies. They maintained that even though 
the United States had long adhered to the principle of 
non-interference in the affairs of Europe, the nation 
must now suddenly depart from that policy. They further 
claimed that it must be ready to participate in an economic
^^Ibld.. 3608.
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or military war against any nation which violated the terri­
torial integrity or the political independence of any nation 
which was e member of the League of Nations.
Previous to this immediate era, sterling recalled, it 
was highly improbable that any person, senator or otherwise, 
would have dared suggest a program which would have imposed 
upon the United states the obligations which were incorpora­
ted in Article 10 of the present Covenant. Or at least no 
such obligation would have been accepted without due consi­
deration of the rl^teousness of the cause of that nation 
whose territorial integrity or political independence had 
been violated, or, without consideration of the distance, or
of the expenses end sacrifices which such interventions 
24would involve.
■ For those who desired such an Immediate and precipi­
tate departure from our traditional policies, sterling fur­
ther urged that the vicious system which had brought about 
the great war was altogether unusual and abnormal. Its 
prime cause, he said, was Prussianism, and Prusslanlsm had 
met its 7/aterloo. But Americans acted as if the battle had 
been a draw, and the theory that might makes right was still
^^Ibid.. S609. These obligations were embodied in 
Articles 10 and 16.
"̂̂ Ibid,. 3609. Elihu Root advanced a similar argu­
ment against intervention, namely that the United states 
should not "set aside its traditional policy of non-inter­
ference in Europena affairs" unless there were "sufficient 
affirmative reasons for doing so." Jessup, 391-2,
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formidable. They seemed to believe, he said, that the evil 
spirits of ÎJletzsche and Bernhard1 still Imposed their vicious 
ways upon the Germans through the will of a kaiser, and that
perhaps some other nation was now impregnated with the same
25spirit of conquest and aggrandizement.
But Sterling's conviction was that no such menace 
could threaten the world for at least a generation to come, 
Even If It should, he asked, who would doubt that the Ameri­
can people, inspired as they had been so recently, would 
come fully armed, without the compulsion of a league of 
nations, to fight for liberty and justice? The Americans, 
he urged, had been Inspired by their own ideals end they 
had fought in defense of their own principles. And the 
glory of it all was that the Americans had participated 
freely and of their own will, and not by the will of a 
foreign tribunal whose power could determine when we were 
to come to the aid of the Serb, the Croat, Slam, Eejaz or 
Persia, The United States would offer Its services when­
ever they were needed, but it would do so at Its own
volition, through "Congress assembled and sworn to support
26the Constitution of the United i>tates.
After a brief attack on the Bhantung settlement. 
Sterling tempered his opposition to the Covenant by pointing
^^Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 3610.
26Ibid,. 3610.
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out that the people of Europe were fully ewsre of the origin 
of the Monroe Doctrine end other time-honored American poli­
cies. And because of their familiarity with these policies, 
he believed that they certainly would not object to reserva­
tions which would leave to the United states Congress the
right to determine wh^jWTSi> or not this country should inter-
27fere in the affairs of the other nations of the world.
Senator Wesley Jones, in the midst of a long speech, 
declared that iunericans had entered the war as patriots, 
end that in emerging from it, they should remain Americans, 
Therefore, neither partisanship nor personal prejudice should 
have any place in the consideration of the treaty. He in­
sisted that the treaty should be considered in an American 
spirit end with a sincere devotion to American ideals end 
American good. In deciding what was and what wee not 
iimericenism In our dealings with other nations, nothing 
could be worse than a division on party lines.
But nevertheless, Jones held, the attitude of Pres­
ident Wilson was culpable on many points. He, Wilson, 
expected the Senate to ratify the treaty just as it stood 
end without consideration of it. The President "knew it 
all," and was under the impression that his Covenant was
2?lbld.. 3611. In a short statement. Sterling also 
denounced the Shantung settlement. Ibid.. 3611.
28ibid.. 6333. This speech was made in regard to 
the revised Covenant.
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impossible of improTsment• Then when the Senate proceeded 
to discuss and analyse the Covenant in pursuance of its 
patriotic and constitutional duties, he threatened that body 
with the "wrath of the people," He began his tour of the 
country seeking to force the nation to obey his will with­
out consideration of the merits or demerits of the docu­
ment.^®
Jones held, moreover, that Wilson, while defending 
democracy, actually practiced autocracy. He had named him­
self peace commissioner, and the associates which he chose 
were "mere dummies." And in order to have his way, he had 
so entwined the treaty and the League Covenant together 
that it would have been impossible to ratify one without 
the other. Lastly, he attempted to use industrial restive­
ness, business chaos, the desire for peace end the desire 
for the return of the American soldiers as means to force 
ecoption of the League,
To Jones this attitude was unworthy of any greet men 
and was an assault upon the fundamentals of the American 
government. Actually, he said, it was Wilson's undoing.
It threatened to defeat the Covenant and it had enabled 
the other nations to obtain Wilson's sanction of their
Id., 6332-3, A reference to Wilson's tour of 
the west in September, 1919,
S^Ibld,. 6332.
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**ooT«tou8 desires, the violation of his lofty Ideals, and
left him but a shadow of his Idealistic dreams." He was
forced to approve of the Shantung settlement, and to allow
Britain to remain the "undisputed mistress of the seas" In
order that he have his League. And on top of this, all the
other nations entered the League hoping to use American
blood to guard Europe end to use American money to pay
31their debts and their war expenses.
There were three facts In the President's life,
Jones observed, which would make one reluctant to follow 
him and which would furnish an interesting "psychological" 
study for the future. Wilson, for example, always said 
those things which the occasion seemed to demand In order 
to attain his ends. He could be quoted by anyone to uphold 
a position on "any question from the days of Washington to 
the present." Also, he had been quite consistent, since 
his accession to the presidency, in giving in to the de­
mands of the British Empire— from the question of the 
Panama Canal tolls to the freedom of the seas— and to the
frank admission of the supremacy of British sovereignty
32and citizenship.
iMÉ*» 6333. The freedom of the seas was the 
second of Wilson's Fourteen Points, but because of British 
opposition, it was not discussed at Paris. Bailey, The 
Lost Peace. 367.
52Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 6333. Wilson had long been an admirer of British 
institutions. Bailey, Diplomatic History. 615.
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Jones believed that President Wilson, regrettably, 
had done more by word and by deed to "undermine orderly, 
peaceful representative government than any other human
agency."33
Jones insisted that the Covenant would not be re­
jected so long as the vital Interests of the United States 
were well protected, and that the peace end progress of the 
world would be promoted even at the expense of the Presi­
dent's vanity. The good parts of the Covenant, he said, 
would be retained, and most of what was bad would be 
rejected;
%hen we consent to It with such changes as we think 
best for our country's good, It will rest with the 
President whether the concurrence of the other coun­
tries shell be sought. Be can refuse It or not as be 
sees fit. If the world's heart is broken, he will 
break It. If the world's hope of peace shall die, 
he will kill It.34
Analysing the terms of the treaty, Jones began with 
the voting power of the British Empire. The Empire had been 
given six votes In the Assembly and the United States re­
ceived only one. But whenever nations were dealing with 
one another, each should be the equal of any other. This
rule should be observed regardless of a nation's size or 
35power.
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 6333.
34Ibid.. 6334. Evidently a reference to the clause 
In the Lodge reservations regarding the acceptance thereof.
SSlbld., 6334.
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The Covenant, he continued, destroyed this principle
of equality. One nation was set apart as a sovereign power
superior to all others. The British Empire was a permanent
member of the Council, and by its one vote could block action
on any important matter. It was also represented on the
Assembly by six votes, each one of which could also block
26action on almost any matter.
Secondly, in the case of a nation’s withdrawal that 
nation should be the sole judge of whether it had fulfilled 
its obligations under the Covenant, and it should be held 
to those obligations just as nations had always been so 
held.
Nor, said Jones, was the clause which safeguarded the 
Monroe Doctrine really adequate. On a matter of such trem­
endous importance no uncertainties should exist. The Monroe 
Doctrine, he said, was no defined in the treaty, and such 
a definition should not be left in the hands of a council 
of other nations. The United states alone should be the 
judge of what the Monroe Doctrine was, since it was purely 
an American policy. Indeed, it was an American domestic 
policy, promulgated and adhered to for our own peace and 
protection, and our people would not relinquish it nor 
would they allow anyone else to interpret it. Jones in­
sisted that this point should be made clear to all nations 
in any covenant entered into by the United States, just as
SGibid.. 6334.
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there should be no uncertainty regarding the subjection of
37our domestic questions to the jurisdiction of the League.
Concerning action advised by the Council of the 
League, Jones maintained that the United states would be 
morally bound to adhere to a decision of the Council when­
ever the American representative had given his consent to 
that decision. Therefore this country should be very care­
ful of what promises It made, because no congress, with 
public support behind It, would ever send American troops 
abroad, except for a cause which directly affected American 
peace and safety. Moreover, American political Independence 
should be preserved Inviolate, so that whatever the nation
chose to do. It would be saved from even the appearance of
38dishonorable actions.
Jones further urged that Article 10 should not be 
In the Covenant at all. This article could be removed and 
the rest of the Covenant would remain unaffected. We 
would have a league containing all the powers and duties 
In the Covenant except the provision which guarded against 
external aggression. After all, with restrictions on arma­
ments end the arbitration of disputes through the Council, 
there would be little danger of aggression. The Covenant 
in this way would be a good beginning In the promotion of
3?lbld.. 6335. 
SQjbld.. 6336.
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peaoe, and at the same time It would not pledge this country 
to meddle In aggressive actions all over the world. Eut 
Article 10 as It was then written, rather than being the 
heart of the League, was merely the "safeguard of the fruits 
of an autocratic oligarchy."®®
With the usual jab at the Shantung agreement (the 
"deed of eternal infamy"), Jones continued by urging that 
the treaty should be disposed of as soon as was possible 
in the case of such an important matter, so that all the 
other problems which confronted the nation could be given 
attention without delay.
And then.
The danger to the covenant today comes from the 
President himself. It rests with him and the friends
of a league of nations whether we enter it or not.
He insists that the covenant must be accepted by the 
Senate exactly as he has sent it to us. I know and 
his friends know end he ought to know that if reser­
vations .are not adopted the covenant will be rejected 
in its entirety. If, instead of trying to arouse the 
people against the Senate, he would seek to reach a 
fair and honorable understanding with it, there would 
be little trouble. . .While he has been seeking to 
arouse the people against them, Senators have been 
studying the question. . .determined that reserva­
tions must be made to safeguard the rights, the 
welfare, the peace and honor of this country.
These reservations are going to be adopted. . .and
if the treaty is not ratified and the United States 
fails to enter the league of nations, Woodrow Wilson, 
President of the United states, alone will prevent it.
3®Ibid.. 6336. Probably a reference to Britain's 
alleged use of this article to hold down her dominions or 
parts of empire.
40lbid.. 6337.
41lbid., 6337.
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On the day before the November votes on the treaty, 
Jones made a last bid by reoommendlng four additional 
reservations of his own making:
He proposed that China be given complete sovereignty 
over Shantung, that Anglo-Irish relations be adjusted "to 
the satisfaction of the Irish people," that Egypt, which 
had Just been made a protectorate of Great Britain, should 
receive complete independence, and that each member of the 
League abolish conscription in p e a c e t i m e . ^2
Such was the stand taken by Wesley Jones of Washing­
ton, the strongest of the Northwest reservationists and a 
good example of the kind of opposition which confronted 
Wilson in the Senate.
Sterling, Warren and Jones agreed on a number of 
Important issues. Each was determined that, if the United 
States should join the League, it should reserve the right 
to withdraw any time it pleased. Each was determined that 
Article 10 was not going to be binding upon this country in 
any way repugnant to traditional American policies or to 
the detriment of American sovereignty. Also, they were all 
agreed that the Monroe Doctrine was to remain, as it always 
had been, the unilateral policy of the United states. Jones 
and Warren voiced dissatisfaction with British voting power 
In the Assembly and both were apprehensive about the safety
42lbid.. 8747. These reservations were rejected by 
the Senate. Ibid.« 8748.
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of American Jurladictlon over its domestic affairs. Finally, 
all were agreed that the Shantung settlement was an injus­
tice and that it should not be accepted "without some word 
of protest,"
Giving form to the substance of their opposition, 
the Lodge reservations sufficiently satisfied these sena­
tors so that they consented to a "limited liability" parti­
cipation by the United States in the League of Nations.
The first Lodge reservation allowed the United States 
to be the sole judge of whether it had fulfilled its obli­
gations, in case it wished to withdraw. The second reserved 
.to the United States Congress the final voice in accepting 
or rejecting any obligation or decision made in pursuance 
of Article 10 or any other part of the Covenant. Number 
four allowed the United States to be the exclusive judge in 
deciding what questions were within its domestic jurisdic­
tion, and the fifth made the United States the sole inter­
preter of the llonroe Doctrine. Concerning Shantung, the 
United States refused, by the sixth reservation, to assent 
to the Shantung settlement and reserved "full liberty of 
action with respect to any controversy, . .between the 
Republic of China and the Empire of Japan." And in regard, 
Implicity, to British voting power, the fourteenth reserva­
tion, in its final form, stated that until the United States 
should receive an equal number of votes, it would not be 
bound by any decision of the Council or the Assembly when 
Great Britain and its dominions or parts of empire in the
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aggregate had cast more then one vote. It further provided, 
in effect, that in any dispute between the United states and 
Great Britain, the United Btates would not be bound by any 
decision or report if Great Britain or any part of its 
empire had voted.
Were it not for the Lodge reservations, these strong 
reservationists might never have consented to ratification 
of the treaty. Drawn to its logical conclusion, the oppo­
sition of these senators would be identical to that of the 
outright opponents. Except for the statements by the strong 
reservationists which actually defended the League of Nations, 
the speeches of the two groups are almost indistinguishable.
reservation on Shantung did not grant full 
Chinese control of shantung as Jones, for example, would 
have wished.
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MILD RESERVATIONISTS
The attitudes of the two mild reservationists in the 
Northwest, Charles L. McNary of Oregon and Porter J. MoCumber 
of North Dakota, constitute a radical departure from those 
of the strong reservationists. To both of these senators, 
the Covenant was a noble instrument, sufficient in strength 
possibly to provide for a peaceful world order, and at the 
same time not so binding as to subject the United States to 
the caprice of foreign powers. They sew no objection to the 
nation's assumption of the responsibilities of a family of 
nations and, in their enthusiasm for its benefits, they 
seldom found reason to distrust or fear the intentions of 
other countries. With the memory of the recent war still 
fresh in their minds, their interest in preventing another 
such catastrophe was quickened. Unlike so many, they were 
not BO sure that the United States could afford to be in­
different^ to ell but the welfare of its own interests.
These men. Republicans, were among the most ardent 
friends of the League on either side of the chamber, sena­
tor McNary declared himself in favor of any effort to en­
sure peace and he declared himself soundly in favor of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. His position was one 
between "general statements of the sublimities of peace,"
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and "indulging with owlish wisdom the ominous predictions of
a disgraced and destroyed Republic."^ By the adoption of
harmless, interpretive reservations, he maintained, such
questions as domestic matters, the Monroe Doctrine and
obligations of war without consent of Congress could be
2placed beyond the sphere of controversy* Senator MoCumber 
revealed an equally favorable judgment of the League when he 
explained that he supported a number of the Lodge reserva­
tions, not because he necessarily agreed with them, but 
because he felt that they were necessary to secure enough
g
votes for ratification. He also believed that the reser­
vations were not so strong as to kill the treaty and that 
they were mild enough actually to gain support for the 
treaty from both parties.^ He maintained that the League 
of Nations was so foreign to any kind of partisanship that 
its consideration should not have been influenced by hos-
5tility toward or subserviency to the President. On these 
grounds he pleaded with the Democrats to compromise, just
^Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 1 session, 
LVIII, 2983.
^Ibid.. 2985.
^Ibid.. 8561.
4lbid.. 8786.
^Senate Report No. 176, Part 3, Senate Reports, I, 
September 10, 1919.
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g
as he himself was willing to do.
In reviewing the attitudes of these two senators, 
their arguments are found to be, in substance, very similar 
to those of the Democratic proponents of the League. Each 
looked upon the League of Nations as the only possible in­
strument for the maintenance of peace, and each undertook 
coldly and rationally to analyse the provisions in the 
Covenant to attempt to point out the deceptiveness in the 
attacks of the stronger opponents. Each believed that the 
efficacy of the League of Nations was more than an illusion 
and that the Dnited States, by joining, would have nothing 
to lose and perhaps much to gain.
Senator McNary chose to discuss the focal points of 
the controversy. The questions of constitutionality, 
national sovereignty and the ramifications of Article 10 
were the main themes of his declamations.
He first challenged the objection that Article 10 
collided with our constitution and that it ran contrary to 
path of our sacred traditions. The Council of the League, 
he asserted, could only advise on what action should be 
taken in case of an aggression by one state against another. 
After that advice was rendered, he said, it was up to the 
individual members to adopt the recommendation if they 
wished, though if the means were practical and just, most
•̂ onRresslonel Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
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of the nations would probably follow It. And Inasmuch as 
the obligations under Article 10 were only moral In character, 
the United States would not have to go to war unless, in case 
of an aggression, that aggression violated "the moral con-
7science of the /mierloan people."
McNary pointed out that, under Article IX, Section £ 
of the United States Constitution, the President was em­
powered, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make 
treaties, provided that two-thirds of the senators present 
concurred. And further, under Article VI all treaties were 
declared to be a part of the supreme law of the land. It 
was clear, he said, that the founders of the Constitution 
were quite generous In the power they conferred upon the 
Executive In the matter of treaty making. But, said McNary, 
this treaty making power was not unlimited. It had been 
decided by the supreme Court that nothing could be done In 
pursuance of a treaty which was forbidden by the Constitu­
tion.® It was therefore impossible, be said, that the 
treaty making power could usurp those prerogatives of the 
legislature which had been conferred on that branch by the 
fundamental law of the land. He argued that when the Con­
stitution provided how and by what means war should be de­
clared, the agency responsible for such a declaration was
Tibia.. 2983. 
Qlbld.. 2983.
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meant to operate in an exclusive field, and its right to 
function in that field "can not be abrogated, lessened, or 
enlarged by the treaty-making power." Hence the executive 
and the Senate could not obligate the United States to a 
future declaration of war on any nation, regardless of the 
justness of the case. Moreover, McNary stressed, interna­
tional law recognized the constitutional limitations under 
which a nation made its treaties, and it was legally binding
upon the signatories to the Covenant to respect those limita- 
9tions.
There was no doubt, he continued, as to the extent 
end nature of the obligations imposed by Article 10. The 
United States would be under a moral bond to fulfill its 
own obligations and to go to war, if necessary, whenever 
war was justified. In fact, he said, in any future case of 
wanton aggression by one nation against another, such an 
aggression would arouse the moral sentiments of the American 
people to the point of persuading Congress to declare war.
But actually, he continued. Article 10 called for action 
only after more peaceful methods had been employed, as 
Articles 11 through 17 provided for such settlements as 
mediation, arbitration, adjudication and economic boycotts. 
And finally, if Article 10 should be used, it would be 
binding only when the American people felt morally justified
Glbid.. 2983.
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in stopping a given act of aggression,
Nor, said McNary, did Article 10 have the power to 
interfere with the internal affairs of a nation, because by 
Article 15, Section 7, such things were placed beyond League 
jurisdiction. Also, he recalled, the supreme Court had de­
cided that by the rules of international law, such subjects 
as the tariff and immigration were solely within the juris­
diction of this country and impossible of alienation by
^  11 treaty.
McNary asserted that the League of Nations Covenant 
should be the fundamental law of nations, operating in a 
universal field as our own organic law did in this country. 
The document, he conceded, only defined general princi­
ples for the conduct of the various governments, and left 
matters of procedure end administration to rules to be 
issued by the Council and the Assembly. But within this 
League of Nations, he said, there would arise a new code 
of international law and justice which would guide the 
nations along the path which led to the peaceful settle­
ment of all international disputes end which avoided 
those controversies which resulted in war. The League of 
Nations, he concluded, was the greatest step which ever 
had been taken toward peace, and as such was the "hope of
lOlbid.. 2984. 
lllbid.. 2984.
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the world,
Of all the members of the United States Senate,
Porter J, MoCumber was perhaps the most relentless In his 
efforts to secure ratification of the treaty. Surely he 
was among the most profoundly convinced that the League of 
Nations was, as McNary called it, the "hope of the world,"
He was perhaps the senator who was farthest removed from 
any partisan spirit, at least on his own side of the cham­
ber. Besides being the only Republican to vote for the 
treaty without the reservations, as a member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee he broke with his own (Republican) 
majority, and submitted a report on the treaty which con­
tained both an excoriation of the Lodge faction and a com­
mendable defense of the principles which the League Covenant 
embodied.
In pleading for acceptance of the League of Nations, 
Me Cumber ranged, in his arguments, over almost every rami­
fication of the issue, moral end political. Like McNary 
and others, he did his best to vindicate those provisions in 
the Covenant which bad been the objects of the most severe 
criticism. Also he believed that it was the bounden duty 
of the American people to realise that the nations of the 
modern world were so interdependent as to preclude any 
notion of selfish isolation. He was convinced that the 
United States could lose nothing by becoming a member of
l^Ibld.. 2985,
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the League, and he was keenly aware of the consequences if 
the nations of the modern world did not unite in a concerted 
effort to preserve peace.
Less than two months after the Armistice, MoCumber 
took his stand as an outright advocate of some kind of 
organization for the maintenance of international security:
. .the world looks with hopeful eyes to this 
Peace Commission for some international arrangement 
that will make impossible another such war. We have 
seen the thunderbolt of war shot from the serenest skies 
of peace. We have seen nations basking in the sun of 
tranquility suddenly swept by the hurricane of a life 
and death struggle. We have seen more than four years 
of the most devasting and sanguinary, the most savage 
and brutal battles that have ever blackened the earth. 
And as we reach its close, even the shouts of the vic­
tors are drowned by the lamentations of mothers, the 
weeping of fatherless children, by the anguished sobs 
of millions upon millions of poor bereaved mortals 
, . .1 am optimistic enough to believe that great 
world wars can be prevented, and that the time to 
present and adopt the restrictive and preventive 
measures is now and not some indefinite time in the 
future— is today, when the awful horrors and conse­
quences of war are apparent to every heart— and not 
when those horrors are forgotten and only the mili- , 
tary glamor and glory remain to influence the senti­
ments of humanity."15
When the debates on the League of Nations were well 
under way, MoCumber remained throughout a staunch friend of 
the Administration, in so far as the League was concerned. 
Unlike so many Republicans and some Democrats, he nourished 
no fears, real or fancied, of an American surrender of 
sovereignty. Nor did he entertain those views that American 
participation would embroil this country in countless
^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 Session, 
L7II, 1083.
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quarrels beyond the frontiers of its own interest. By contrast 
with so many, he was strikingly modern in his appreciation of 
the fact that the world was such as to necessitate an active 
interest in its affairs by the United states.
In challenging the arguments of the opposition, Mc- 
Cumber mentioned that the opponents of the League had as­
serted that the quarrels of Europe were no concern of ours. 
Nothing, he believed, could be farther from the truth. The 
murder at Sarajevo in 1914 had precipitated a war which 
cost the United States the lives of over fifty-thousand 
boys, and imposed upon the country a debt of forty-billion 
dollars, a debt which eventually would increase to one 
hundred-billion, was it possible, he asked, that such a 
conflict la Europe was one which did not concern usf Or 
could the United States remain indifferent to the possibil­
ity, Indeed the probability, that another and yet worse war 
would ravage the earth?
MeCumber reminded the Senate that about twenty-million 
people had died as a result of the recent war. Only a small 
proportion of these had been Americans, but they were all of 
the same blood and of the seme ambitions, hopes and aspira­
tions, and in them all the "love of life was equally strong," 
Now all those hopes and aspirations were buried with mangled 
bodies, end there were yet those who contended that the war 
was no concern of ours,^^
^^Congressional Record. £6 Congress, 1 session 
LVIII, 1264.
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The United States, he admitted, #as secure in its 
isolation and in its vast resources end population, but that 
security, he said, did not excuse the United States from its 
obligations toward the less fortunate peoples of the world. 
It was the divinely imposed duty of this country to shield 
the weak end to compel international right.
It was MoCumber*8 belief that there was no morel 
duty binding upon any man which was not equally binding 
upon one nation in its relations with other nations. There­
fore, he continued, what was needed at this time was an 
international law on the subject, a law which would declare 
that war by one nation was a matter of concern for ell the 
others. It should expressly forbid an unjust war to be
waged by any nation. And such, he said, was the exact
15purpose of the League of Nations.
Without the League of Nations, he continued, the 
understanding that a war of annihilation by one nation 
against another was no concern to the rest of the world, 
would continue to prevail. It would continue to be under­
stood that no nation was bound to defend the cause of the 
weak. He pointed out that the United States itself, for 
example, did not enter the late war on a great world 
principle. Never a word was uttered about the entrance 
of this country being for the cause of humanity. It 
entered solely because Germany, by her actions, had made
ISlbld.. 1265,
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wer upon us., Once we were In, be admitted, we claimed that 
we were fighting for a great cause, but it was really that
1 ftcause for which we entered.
McCumber believed that the United states should be 
placed in such a position that it would never again have to 
reiterate a falsehood in order to vindicate itself in the 
eyes of its own people end in the eyes of the world. It 
should be in such a position that it could say, ’’under the ' 
letter of this bond and for the defense of this principle 
we command you to halt your armies, and to maintain that 
principle we will consecrate the blood of our men, the tears 
of our women, and every resource of our Nation.
McCumber also lamented that the war was carried on 
so far from American shores that the people knew little of 
its horrors and of the destitution which it left behind. He 
maintained that if the American people could only realize 
the sufferings of one dying soldier, if they could view the 
agonies of a drowning man, or if they could view the millions 
of armless, legless, eyeless men, destined to suffer for the 
rest of their lives, then nothing in the world could prevent 
the immediate demand for such a combination of the peoples 
of the world as would prevent a repetition of such a catas­
trophe.^®
IGibid.. 1265. 
l?Ibid.. 1265. 
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The Covenant of the League of Nations, he said, repre­
sented the deliberations of nations large and small. It 
dealt with complex situations in Europe, both racial and 
political. It came to us as a compromise contract, which 
all the nations believed would accomplish the purpose of 
preserving the peace. To secure the support of this coun­
try, special concessions had been made. The Monroe Doctrine, 
for example, which had never met the approval of any nation 
save Great Britain, was "by this instrument given a world 
sanction.
McCumber admitted that the Covenant was not a perfect 
document; it did not definitely convey all its purposes.
But he believed that it was certainly not susceptible to 
the construction which many of the opponents had used upon 
it. Nor were the criticisms based upon the constructions 
anything but false. He believed that there were few in­
stances wherein an Idea had been so unjustifiably and so
20savagely assailed.
In a sweeping defense of all the provisions, McCumber 
began by saying that the attacks on Article 10 had been with­
out foundation. An agreement to respect the right to live 
88 a nation, he maintained, the inviolable right of terri­
tory, was the very basis of international peace. He realized 
that however a nation chose to administer its internal
19ibid.. 1267. 
SOlbid.. 1267.
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affairs was a matter of its own concern, and with such things 
the League had nothing to do. But what the League could and 
should do was to warn all the other nations to keep their 
hands to themselves. Also, he recalled, it had been asserted 
again and again that by Article 10, the United states would 
be compelled to help Great Britain hold down all her domin­
ions as against their own internal rebellions or revolutions. 
This argument, be said, was also false. Any British posses­
sion or part of the Empire could assert and maintain its 
freedom, end the United States would be in no wise obligated 
to come to the aid of the mother country. The League of 
Nations assured protection only against external aggression.
Secondly, he noted, in all the arguments against the 
League, there was much talk of the powers which the United 
States would lose if it should join such an organization.
Yet he also recalled that never a word was mentioned about 
the powers which would be surrendered or restrained by all 
the other nations of the world. Actually, he said, when a 
nation agreed with another nation to do that which it had 
the right to decline to do, it did not, by that agreement, 
surrender its independence or sovereignty. It merely held 
itself honor bound not to exercise its sovereign rights, 
for the duration of the compact, on those subjects covered 
by the agreement.
21lbid.. 1268-9.
22ibid.. 1270.
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It was also claimed, be said, that the provision In 
the Covenant (Article 8) which provided for disarmament among 
the members, the nations of Europe would control our own pro­
duction of armaments. To begin with, he continued, there 
was too much jealousy among the European powers ever to 
enable them effectively to combine against us. But more 
Important, he stressed, since the Council of the League 
could only formulate plans for the "consideration and 
action of the several governments," each nation had to 
agree separately to whatever limitations might be pre­
scribed. Hor, he said, was the constitutional right of 
Congress to raise and support armies Infringed upon or 
limited by this article. Congress, he urged, would have 
to adopt any plan before the United States became even 
morally bound. For example, provision was made In the 
Covenant that the Council should formulate a general plan 
for disarmament, end this could only be effective when each 
end every nation had agreed. Article 8 was no more binding 
upon the United States than upon any other party to the 
agreement.
Concerning British voting power, McCumber recalled 
that the opponents consistently overlooked the fact that 
the British Empire had but one single vote In the Council, 
and that the Council could act. In any substantive matter, 
only by unanimous concurrence. By this principle of
25lbld.. 1270-1.
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unanimityr he eeid, the United States could prevent additional 
memhera (e.£. members of the British Empire) from being ad­
mitted to the Council, because even though a majority of 
the Assembly could approve new members, It was the Council 
which named them.^^
Nor, he said, could disputes be removed to the Assembly 
(as provided in Article 15) without the approval of the 
United States in the Council, because such action also re­
quired unanimous consent by the latter body. He pointed 
out that for such an action it was necessary that the appli­
cation be made by one of the disputants, and that that 
application be made within fourteen days after the submis­
sion of the dispute to the Council. The Council could then, 
if it wished (there was no compulsion), refer the dispute 
to the Assembly, and such a removal of a dispute was not 
among the exceptions to the requirement for unanimous 
consent as provided in Article 5. Furthermore, it was 
only on the merits of the question under dispute, be con­
tinued, that the votes of the disputants were excluded 
by Article 15, and even then, the unanimous verdict of
all the members remaining was required to indicate even
25the judgment of the Council.
But, said McCumber, even if a dispute should be
24lbid.. 1271-2.
25lbld.. 1272. 
was meant the usual recommendation.
^^I By the "judgment" of the Council
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referred to the Assembly, the United States bad nothing to
fear from Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa.
Those Dominions comprised "people of the same inheritance,
the same ideals, the same aspirations," and it would be
unjust to deny them their votes in the Assembly.^® Even
France, he said, the nation most jealous of its rights,
did not object to this so-called uneven voting power of
the British Empire.
Concluding on this subject. MoCumber further pointed
out that, if a dispute should be referred to the Assembly,
all the parts of the British Empire would be excluded if
that dispute involved any one of them. And again, and
equally important, the strongest power possessed either
by the Council or the Assembly was that of making a recom- 
28mandation.
Coming to Article 11, he recalled that it had main­
tained by the opponents that under this article, such
domestic questions as Immigration could be submitted for 
29consideration. It held, for example, that China or 
Japan might claim that an American exclusion law would
26ibld.. 1272.
2?Ibid.. 6439.
28ibld.. 6439. Mo Cumber's claim that the Dominions 
would be excluded in a dispute involving any one of them 
was not unequivocally supported in Article 15. His own 
(6th) reservation attempted to clarify this discrepancy. 
Supra. 24.
29lbld.. 1273.
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strain the friendship end good understanding between one or 
both of those countries and the United Ltates, This, he 
asserted, was a groundless claim, es Section 7 of Article 15 
stated:
If a dispute between the parties is claimed by one 
of them, and is found by the Council tp arise out of 
a matter which by international lew is solely within 
the domestic Jurisdiction of that party, the Council 
shell so report and shall make no recommendations as 
to its settlement.
Domestic questions, he continued, were too many to 
enumerate, but few could be disputed, and it was easy to 
distinguish between those of domestic end those of inter­
national character. Immigration, for example, was defin­
itely a domestic question. But even if such a matter did 
reach the Council, he stressed, it was to be remembered 
always that the verdict of that body had to be unanimous 
(excluding, of course, the parties to the dispute). But 
more important, he continued, if the members of the Council 
did choose to conspire against the United States, each 
nation would be committing an act of national suicide by 
establishing such a precedent that would compel it to 
place its own purely domestic affairs within the juris­
diction of the League,^®
MoCumber also recalled that there were those sena­
tors who pertinaciously held to the belief that the Monroe 
Doctrine would be seriously endangered by the League of
SOibld.. 1273.
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Nations if ths United States should join. This argument, he 
said, «as also groundless:
While I deny that the Monroe doctrine ever meant any­
thing more than is clearly included in the declaration 
of President Monroe, X would not have this international 
compact itself to define it. The framers of the league 
of nations in the amendment have sought to meet the 
objections made in this country that the Monroe doc­
trine «as not recognized by specifically recognizing it, 31
Therefore, he continued, there was written into the Covenant 
the following words:
Nothing in this document shall be deemed to affect 
the validity of international engagements such as 
treaty obligations or regional understandings like 
the Monroe doctrine for securing the maintenance ofpeace.52
This inclusion. MeCumber believed, should satisfy any
reasonable man. Certainly no one could demand that it go so
far as to define just what the Monroe Doctrine should mean
33under all possible conditions.
Nor, he said, had the Monroe Doctrine ceased to be 
a purely American policy or become a world agreement. Ee 
believed that the above-mentioned provision in the Covenant 
was clear enough that other nations would recognize this, 
as they always had, as an American Monroe Doctrine, simply 
because there had never been any Monroe Doctrine other than
^^Ibid.. 1273. 
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34ours.
Actually, MoCumber reminded the Senate, this policy 
had too often been used as a policy of defiance rather than 
one acceptable to other nations. The purpose of the Monroe 
Doctrine was solely to prevent the actual conquest of Latin- 
American countries by foreign nations and to prevent such 
territories from being "bargained, sold, or given away to 
any European power."
Returning to the Covenant itself, MeCumber explained 
what be considered to be the reasons for the creation of 
both a Council and an Assembly: The nations of the world 
were divided into two distinct groups— the great end power­
ful and the small and less powerful, and also the stable 
and reliable and the unstable and unreliable. In each 
case the great and powerful were the stable and reliable.
It was therefore obvious that the latter groups should be 
the "backbone of this league." But because the Council 
could only include the strong powers, it was fitting and 
proper that there should be some forum through which the 
voices of all the nations could be heard. To meet this 
requirement, the Assembly as a distinct body was estab­
lished, so that the woes and complaints of any country, 
regardless of the backwardness or instability of its people
S^ibid.. 1273, 
35ibld.. 1274.
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oould be heard.
It was MoCumber*8 prediction that if the United States 
should refuse to join the League, the great nations of the 
world would then proceed to devise the means for the eventual 
destruction of nations. He prophesied that the nation which 
was "most learned, most thorough, and assiduous" would under­
take the manufacture of gas bombs which could wipe out a 
city like New York, London, Paris or Berlin in a single raid. 
He pointed out that the sciences of aircraft end chemical 
warfare were at this time in their infancy, but the nation, 
he believed, which was foremost in the development of such 
Satanic engines would triumph over those nations which 
would rebel against such hideous methods. The next war 
would be 60 desperate that all the ills created by the 
last would be nothing in comparison.®'^ Therefore, he said,
I could not oast my vote against any reasonable 
agreement to secure future world peace without a 
conviction that would follow me to the grave, that 
I had committed an unpardonable offence against all 
future generations. . ."38
All that we can be sure of is that the instrument 
comes to us as a compromise, and in it is the soul of 
a future world freedom. It is within our power to 
strangle the body, but the soul will live and ever 
seek reembodiment in some future international or­
ganization.®®
Both MoKary and MeCumber, as mild reservationists.
®^Ibld.. 1274. 
37ibld.. 1275. 
®Qjbid.. 1276. 
59lbld.. 1274.
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ere good examples of the more disinterested attitudes which 
could be Aund among Republicans in the Senate of 1919. Both 
were members of that party, and it was that party which gave 
to the League Covenant almost all of its strong opposition. 
Bit neither of these senators allowed such party sympathies 
to stand in the way of his own efforts to encourage the 
United States to partake of the duties, obligations and 
benefits of the proposed new world order.
MoCumber, in particular, stood alone as the senator 
most exemplary in his efforts to convince everyone that the 
United States should join what he considered a positive end 
workable system for the preservation of world peace. He 
was the senator most visibly immune to the ties of party 
prejudice, and for that he deserves much commendation.
The strong and fervent pleas for ratification of the 
treaty by these men were not unlike the equally fervent 
pleas of many of the Democrats. Just as the strong reser­
vationists and the irreconcilables were often closely 
related, MoNary and MoCumber were just as closely allied, 
in spirit, to the Administration Democrats.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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ADMINISTRATION DEMOCRATS
With the exoeption of Senator Myers of Montana, who 
showed no real concern over the League question, the North­
west Democrats were all ardent champions of International 
cooperation. The most famous of these was Thomas J. Walsh, 
also of Montana. John F. Nugent of Idaho was conspicuous, 
end Edwin £, Johnson of South Dakota, though a strong friend 
of the League, was less outstanding.
Like MoNary and MoCumber, each was a man of fore­
sight, and believed that the League of Nations was a posi­
tive step toward international peace. Each also was con­
vinced that it was the duty of the United States to join 
that organization. Senator Johnson, in his plea for 
ratification, confined most of his remarks to the moral or 
ideological aspects of the issue. Walsh and lAigent, however, 
were more realistic in that they departed from this phase 
of the question and grappled with the roots of the contro­
versy in an attempt to dispel certain doubts and fears which 
were raised by the attacks of the opposition. Both these 
men, as well as Myers, were not unwilling to compromise and 
ratify the treaty with the Lodge reservations attached.
Walsh distinguished himself as a member of the bipartisan 
conference in January, 1920, by an attempt to cooperate
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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with Senator Lodge In order to bring about an agreement be­
tween the opposing factions. Agreement was never reached, 
but unlike many Democrats including Johnson, walsh, along 
with Nugent and Eîyers, preferred loyalty to the cause 
rather than deference to the President.
Senator Myers made few remarks on the League of 
Nations except at a very late date. Judging by the speeches 
he did make, it is doubtful that he made much of an im­
pression on the Senate. As early in the strife as December, 
1919, when the controversy had been raging for about a year, 
he observed that, in his opinion, there was "politics on 
both sides in the contest."^ But on the same day he de­
clared his willingness to vote for most of the reservations
2"in the interest of compromising and getting together."
It was this spirit which brought Myers to the conclusion 
that the League of Nations was worth a try.
But the League of Nations to begin with, he said, 
had failed miserably. It had not even the strength to 
force the Dutch to give up the Kaiser so that he could be 
tried. Nor had it yet forced the Germans— who were all 
guilty of atrocities— to surrender the other offenders.
And to expect the Germans themselves to try them (!) was 
unthinkable. It would be like putting a "bootlegger on
^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, 
LIZ, 738.
Sjbld.. 738.
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2trial before a Jury of bootleggers."
la answer to those who contended that the peace terms 
were too harsh, Myers deftly replied that they were too 
lenient. The German people themselves, he believed, were 
as much to blame as the Kaiser, because they were perfectly 
willing to follow him. Moreover, for generations, he said, 
the German people had been drinking toasts to "Der Tag," 
the day when they would embark upon a campaign of world 
conquest. Therefore the armistice with Germany was the 
"greatest mistake in the history of the world in a thousand 
years.
Germany should have been brought to the earth and 
ground into the dust of the earth, so that she would 
not have any spirit to revive in a thousand years to 
come. The German nation should have been dismembered, 
the States that comprised it should have been sepa­
rated and forbidden. . .to constitute any langer a 
central power under one general government.
Myers also noticed another proposition whereby the 
League would be gravely at fault. It seemed that there was 
a desire on the part of some to admit Germany as a member. 
Nothing, he believed, could be more repugnant.
X never heard before, if a brute of a monster ra­
vishes your wife and your daughter, when he is arrested 
for it and it is proven on him, that you should Invite 
him into your home and to your dinner table. . •
And because it was also rumored that help was to be sent to
Sibid.. 4585-6.
% b i d .. 4586-7.
Sibid.. 4587. 
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Bolshlvlst Russia through the League of Nations and that Great 
Britain was going to recognize that country, î.îyers held, there 
was further room for diaappointment in the League. Extermina­
tion, he believed, should hold for Russia as well as for
nGermany.'
In spite of it all, however, Myers managed to see 
some good in the League. There were provisions in the Coven­
ant which he heartily opposed and there were also many re­
servations which likewise did not meet his approval. Yet 
there was a ray of hope, and on that hope he would place 
his faith. If the great and powerful United States should 
join the League of Nations, he said, conditions might be­
come better. We could ”bring the world out of the chaos
which now prevails and the abyss into which it is rapidly
6sinking deeper and more helplessly." Clear as ever, Myers 
concluded:
So I have determined once more to vote for ratification 
of this pact. I have voted for it twice and I am going 
to vote for it once more, and if it fails of ratifica­
tion this time, I do not know whether I shall ever vote 
for it again. If I should occasion to vote for ir ag^in, 
as I hope I may not, for I hope it may be ratified this 
time, I think I would have to have some proof, more 
then I have had, of the efficacy of the League of Na­
tions in operation. . .Though I am not at all satis­
fied with the workings of the League of itotions, and 
am not satisfied with the pact itself, nor with all 
of the reservations. . .yet, in the hope of bettering 
conditions, I shall once more cast my vote for ratifi-
?Ibid.. 4587. 
Bibid.. 4588.
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.And with that the matter rested,
Senator Johnson of South Dakota stated his belief that
membership in the League of Nations was the greatest quest)n
that the United States Senate had had to consider since the
10formation of the government. It was a question, he believed, 
which would affect the welfare and happiness of the American 
people 88 none had ever done before.
After many months of deliberation, he said, the peace 
conference presented this "wonderful document," the League 
of Nations Covenant, and upon his examination of its provi­
sions, Johnson found that they were quite plain and clear.
Its efficacy, he said, was built upon the fact that fear of 
the law, punishment and publicity was one of the most power­
ful inducements to obedience by men and nations, and on the 
fact that such a fear could compel obedience when necessary.
Considering the ineffable horrors and destructiveness 
of the late war, end the almost complete ignorance of such 
horrors on the part of the American people, Johnson main­
tained that we had gained nothing by our contribution to 
the victory if we should allow the old conditions to persist 
so that the same sacrifices would have to be repeated. Rati­
fication of the treaty, he believed, was both a moral and
Sibid.. 4588.
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 2985-8.
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national duty, and the oontentlon was false that the United 
States could afford to ignore all but its own interests. 
Moreover, he continued, no man or nation had ever been 
strong enough to stand elone; such reasoning was that of a 
selfish man or nation, and whoever accepted it would be 
liable to the "just condemnation of all liberty-loving 
people."
Johnson protested to the Senate that the world had-by 
that time reached a period in scientific development wherein 
the greatest cities in the United States could be destroyed, 
along with their populations, by air attack. Ee protested 
that the isolated position which had been nature's gift to 
America was no longer reliable as a safeguard against attack 
by foreign foes. Future wars, he predicted, would be fought 
in the air end beneath the water, and they would be so com­
plete in their destructiveness that the powers of good 
government might cease to exist, and the world might then 
be ruled by power, hate and brute force, With these things 
in mind, he said, the American people should not allow them­
selves the luxury of imaginary security, nor should they 
reject the very plan which might possibly end wars forever.
In December of 1919, after the treaty had suffered 
its first defeat, Johnson undertook to blame the Republican- 
controlled Houses of Congress plus a few Democrats for wast­
ing an entire session of congress in their attempt to 
destroy the only foundation for a lasting peace. Domestic 
conditions, he said, were worse than ever, end restiveness
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and discontent were manifest, and Bolshevism, radicalism 
and socialism were spreading throughout the land. The gov­
ernment was threatened, he said, from all sides, and the 
people were impatiently waiting for attention while a few 
men in the senate quarreled about the treaty. Therefore, 
he contended, if the people were to be served at that cri­
tical hour, the treaty should be ratified at once so that 
the serious internal problems could be given the proper 
attention. Delay in ratification, he pointed out, was 
costing the government millions of dollars each day, to 
say nothing of the loss of thousands of lives abroad.
Rejection of the League of Nations, Johnson con­
cluded, would be an outright breach of faith with our 
allies and associates, and we could rest assured that the 
United States would pay the price of its foolishness. He 
maintained that by our first refusal (in November) to rati­
fy the treaty we had turned our backs on our friends and 
opened the door to our enemies, and that if we did not 
reverse our attitude, it was possible that ell the English-
speaking people in the world would be destroyed within the
12next twenty years. '
Like Senator Johnson, Senator Nugent of Idaho was 
also convinced that the League of Nations, operating under
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, 
LIZ, 178-9.
l^ibid.. 179.
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the provisions of the Covenant, would be quite able to pre­
sent war entirely or at least to make war practically im­
possible. furthermore, he believed that if the United states 
should fail to ratify the treaty and if, because of that 
failure the League itself should die, the United States
alone would be to blame for the next war, which would "rock
1*5the earth to its very foundation."
In my opinion the next world conflict will be one 
of almost total annihilation of armies and extermina­
tion of peoples because of the advances made by 
scientific men in the art. . .of the destruction of 
men and property. . .There is but one alternative to 
the league of nations, and that is preparation for 
war, which always means war eventually. Without the 
league it will become necessary for us, and every 
other nation to proceed armed to the teeth. We shall 
be obliged to expend billions of dollars. . .in in­
creasing the size of our Navy until it will be equal 
to, or superior to, the navies of any two or three 
nations that might combine against us. • .We shall 
have imposed upon us a system of compulsory military 
service. Our country will become a military camp.
There will be a soldier or a sailor on the back of 
every taxpayer in the nation, end in the end there 
will be another deluge of blood end grief and sorrow 
and suffering in every village and hamlet throughout
the land.
Turning to more concrete issued, Nugent discussed the 
question of constitutionality. He reminded the senate, as 
did many others, that under Article 10 the Council could 
only advise on what measures should be taken in case the 
territorial integrity of a nation should be threatened by 
external aggression. He believed that if war should be
Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 4259-60.
l*Ibid.. 4260.
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decided upon by the. Council there would be no usurpation of 
the powers of Congress because the Congress elone was em­
powered to decide whether or not the United states was 
obligated to take that advice. He also claimed that by 
Article 8, which contained provisions for disarmament. 
Congress again retained the ultimate power to adopt or
15reject whatever plans might be formulated by the Council*
He admitted that If the United States should join
the League It would lose certain of Its rights which people
referred to as sovereign. But the truth was, he said, that
all the other members of the League would lose Identical
rights and that therefore the members would be placed »*ln
the same position with respect to each other that we now
16occupy as sovereign states."
It had been asserted by many, he recalled, that as 
a member of the League, the United Ltates would become em­
broiled in European wars. And the men who made this asser­
tion always invoked the policy and advice of Washington to 
back up their claims. But he reminded the Senate that 
Washington's Farewell Address had been published In 1796 
and had been "prepared In the light of world conditions as 
they then existed," and that In 1919 the United States was 
confronted with a situation entirely different from that 
which previously obtained. As such, therefore, the nation
ISlbld.. 4260. 
IGibld.. 4261.
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was obliged to deal with it. In Washington’s time, he said,
it required months to communloate with Europe, but now it
could be done in a matter of minutes, and in view of the
recent advances made in aviation it was obvious that
American isolation was a thing of the past. Because of
these circumstances, he said, the United States had to take
its place among the nations of the world whether it liked 
17it or not.
Nugent asserted that
nations, like individuals, cannot stand still. They 
must move either forward or backward. This above all 
other ages is one of progress and development, and as 
conditions change. • .policies must be changed so as 
to conform to them. . .The war demonstrated that we 
are not remotely, but immediately and vitally concerned 
in the affairs of Europe, particularly in the quarrels 
that may result in war, and that it is a matter of 
supreme importance to us to bring about such a com­
bination of nations as will make another such world 
conflagration impossible.^®
The îtonroe Doctrine, be continued, should of course 
be preserved, but he also believed that the provision in 
Article 21 was perfectly sufficient to save it. And Article 
10, he maintained, was the heart of the Covenant, as its 
enforcement was the only thing that could prevent the world 
from bursting into flames. After all, he asked, for what 
had the United States used the Monroe Doctrine over the 
years but to preserve the independence of the Latin American
l?Ibid.. 4261, 
l®Ibid.. 4261.
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19countries?
Also, he said, it was very foolish to fear the control
of domestic questions by the League, for such Jurisdiction
was forbidden by Article 15, and such things as tariffs,
immigration, naturalization, etc.. all were recognized by
international law as being domestic in character. Moreover,
he believed, it was intended by the peace conference that
any withdrawing nation was to be the sole Judge as to whether
it had fulfilled its obligations. He believed that the greet
powers represented on the Council would certainly not take
advantage of the United states on these or other questions.
Britain, France and Italy especially, he said, shared too
many sentiments with the United States ever to desire to
20use the powers of the League to our disadvantage.
It was Nugent’s conviction that ratification of the
treaty was a moral obligation. If the United states should
reject it, he said, such a decision would "lead certainly
and inevitably to a catastrophe more awful than that from
21which we are now emerging."
Senator Walsh chose mainly to discuss the implications 
of Article 10 and the Irish q u e s t i o n . A r t i c l e  10, he said, 
was designed to protect a nation as against external aggree-
19lbid.. 4262.
GOlbld.. 4264.
^4bld.. 4265.
^^Ibld.. 3222-8.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
114
slon. This last phrase, he noted, had been persistently 
Ignored by many of the opponents In their arguments that 
the article would be used to prevent a just internal up­
rising or Insurrection. But differing from the Koly Alli­
ance, be said, the aim of which was to put down Internal 
revolts and to preserve monarchlal and despotic rule, the 
League of Nations Covenant limited Its members to the use 
of war only In case of war by one nation against another.
It was urged, said Welsh, that Article 10 would pre­
vent the United States from rushing to the aid of rebellious 
subjects In another land. It was claimed, for example, that 
the League Covenant would have prevented the French from aid­
ing the American colonists. But this argument, he pointed 
out, was raised on false grounds. To begin with, he said, 
the United states would have attained Its Independence with 
or without the help of the French, for British statesmen 
and historians were agreed that England at that time was 
powerless to prevent secession. Secondly, he reminded 
the Senate, It was foolish to assume that France was In 
any wise motivated by altruism when she sympathized with 
the American cause. Be pointed out that the sole purpose 
of the French government was to diminish British power, 
not to free America.
Actually, continued Walsh, disinterested Interven­
tion on behalf of rebellious subjects was not borne out by 
the facts. It was not true, he said, in the case of France, 
nor was It true when the United States Intervened In behalf
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of the Cuban inaurreotionlsts, especially considering that 
we emerged with Porto Rico and the Philippines to balance 
the cost. On the other hand, he continued, ambitious rulers 
with imperialistic aims had often used Intervention as a 
pretext for assisting oppressed subjects, and oftentimes 
internal uprisings had been fomented from abroad so as to 
offer an excuse for an invasion which ended in conquest.
Walsh declared that the contrasting feature of the 
League of Nations was that it was meant to be operated by 
self-governing democracies, not by intriguing kings end 
autocrats who were dominated with the idea of conquest.
For example, he said, if British colonial policy had been 
in the eighteenth century what it had been in more modern 
times, there probably would not have been an American 
revolution.
Concerning Ireland, Walsh admitted that Article 10 
would prevent a member of the League from coming to Irish 
aid. But he also admitted that the opponents who con­
tinually broached the Irish question quite frequently did 
so to arouse the prejudices of American citizens of Irish 
birth or descent. "It is worthy of remark," he said,
that those who most stoutly assail this feature of the 
Covenant avow with almost equal vehemence and insis- 
enoe that we must 'keep out of the quarrels of Europe.' 
In one and the same breath they assert, in effect, that 
if Ireland should rise in revolt against the tyranny of 
Great Britain we would violate the most sacred precepts 
of the fathers by participating in the strife, even in 
aid of the Irish; yet they declaim against Article 10 
because by it we agree not to do so.
To Walsh It was therefore plain that Ireland could
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expect no aid from the United States whether the treaty were 
passed or not. Nor, he said, could the Irish expect any 
support from impotent Germany, England's ally Eranoe, or 
weakened Spain.
To him the'hope for Irish independence lay In Article 
11, whereby a friendly power could bring the situation to the 
attention of the League. Also, he believed, Britain would 
feel freer, with the League in operation, to grant Irish in­
dependence because the alleged military danger of a free 
Ireland would be removed by Article 10.
The Shantung problem offered a similar case, he con­
tinued. Article 10 had been condemned as a guardian of 
the Shantung settlement. Wilson himself, said Welsh, had 
been accused of saving the League by presenting the Japs 
with Shantung. But Walsh argued that China could not be 
helped by the defeat or removal of Article 10, for no 
nation would send forces to take this province from Japan. 
Actually, he said. Article 10 offered China a guarantee 
against the aggression from which she bed been suffering 
for one hundred years, a guarantee which she still sorely 
needed.
To Walsh, as to others. Article 10 was truly the soul 
of the Covenant. He believed that it was the one guarantee 
of peace which the Covenant contained. Some, he said, had 
protested that in case of a Bulgarian attack on Roumania, 
American boys would have to go to that area end fight 
against Bulgaria. If such a thing happened, he said.
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• • .the hoys of Great Britain would equally have to 
to— «Indeed, the boys from every part of the far-flung 
British mplre, as well .as the boys of France and Italy 
'and Spain and Norway and Denmark, of Brazil and Argen­
tina, with those of half a hundred lesser nations—  
and Bulgaria, in that situation would probably take 
council with herself and determine that after all It 
would be more profitable to submit whatever differ­
ences she may have with Roumania to the arbitrament 
of the council of the League.
Moreover, Walsh asserted that the United States was 
at all times the final voice In the fulfillment of any obli­
gation under the League of Nations. Article 10, he urged, 
did not usurp the powers of Congress. He believed that the 
United States was morally but not legally bound to follow 
the advice of the Council, and that Congress Itself would 
always determine whether our obligations were justified by 
the occasion. Furthermore, he said. It would be up to 
Congress to decide in what manner the United States should 
carry out whatever obligations it chose to assume.
In conclusion, Welsh maintained that peace in the
world could only be preserved If the united nations of the
world would be willing to pit their forces behind such a
program of peace and order end by an agreement such as that
manifested by Article 10, wherein the nations agreed to
cooperate as the occasion might demand. The League of
Nations, he said,
recognized the Inveterate character of greed, vanity, 
selfishness, and allied vices In humanity— In nations 
as well as in Individuals. They now assert themselves, 
restrained, only feebly, perhaps, by the precepts of 
the Gospel or an Intelligent perception of self 
interest. The League attempts only to add, in the 
case of nations, the coercion which even primitive 
man found essential to his welfare In the case of
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the members of his little oonmiunity.
It is plain that senator Welsh wes a valuable asset 
to the Wilson Administration in the League of Rations con­
troversy. Article 10 had been the object of much declama­
tion, especially by such Individuals as Borah, Gronna and 
Poindexter. Walsh argued with good reasoning that Article 
10 would not be used for those things which the opponents 
claimed, and he also presented good reasons for the exist­
ence of such an article. When he analysed the arguments 
of the opposition in respect to Ireland, he probably told
the truth when be characterized the motives behind such
opposition, and he also disclosed the basic inconsistency 
of those arguments.
Walsh furthermore commendably admitted that the 
United States, as a world power, was no better than any 
of the. other nations of the world, and that this country 
would be no more obligated by the League of Nations than 
any other member. He was aware of the need, in fact of
the necessity, of international cooperation if there was
to be any hope for the preservation of peace.
The other senators, notably Johnson and Nugent, were 
also cognizant of a new age in world history and they were 
both aware of the lack of wisdom and foresight in isolation. 
Of these two, Nugent was the more outstanding in that he 
departed from the general aspects of the question and, like 
Walsh, attempted to defend certain of the Articles and im­
plications of the issue which had been subject to hostile
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criticism. Ee was anxious to point out that Congressional 
ascendency would not be jeopardized and to state his belief 
that the vital interests of the United States were suffi­
ciently protected in the Covenant itself. This was a 
typically Democratic stand, and perhaps the correct one, 
but Nugent, again like Walsh, and like Myers, was not so 
bound to his party that he would not compromise with the 
uncompromising Republicans when the votes were casfl 
Johnson, however, could not resist a more partisan atti­
tude in his speeches, and remained throughout one of those 
loyal Democrats whose party allegiance prevented ratifies- j 
tlon of the treaty.
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The League of Nations controversy In the United Ltates 
reveals one significant truth. This was the fact that, since 
the debates in the Senate were essentially partisan in char­
acter, and since they lasted for a long and inconclusive 
fifteen months, the United States was not ready to forsake 
those isolationists policies which it had adhered to for so 
many decades. In the Senate, most of these debates were be­
tween those who would ratify the treaty as internationalists 
and those more isolationist members who preferred only 
limited obligations by this country in the Lee^e of Na­
tions. It is significant that the former opinion was 
confined mostly to the members of the Republican party,
While deliberating over the implications of the issue, the 
United States became less interested in membership in in­
ternational organization than in what manner it should 
participate in such a system if it chose to do so.
Many senators eloquently and without regard for party 
affiliation, pleaded the cause of internationalism and for 
American participation in a system which they believed would 
preserve the peace among nations. But even in the case of 
these men, most of their energies were devoted to the attempt 
to refute or repudiate the overpowering persuasiveness of
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those who appealed, for whatever reasons, to the basic iso­
lationism of the American people. Considered in the light 
of the long and confused sessions of the Senate, with its 
forces of partisanship and personal animosities, and along 
side the waning public enthusiasm for an active American 
interest in foreign affairs, such far-sighted arguments as 
those of Walsh, Me Cumber and others were futile. It may be 
reiterated with much truth that
the recrudescence of isolation was felt. . .in the 
Senate. The extent to which it influenced individual 
senators cannot be measured. But it can be asserted 
with as much certainty as is possible in human affairs 
that a sincere belief based on the merits of the issue 
was not the dominant cause of the Senate's action.^
One indication of the lack of a "sincere belief based 
on the merits of the issue" was the struggle for party as­
cendency. Politics did not stop at the water's edge. The 
battle over reservations was what killed the treaty, and 
whether they were necessary or not, it was the Republicans 
who supported them and most of the Democrats who opposed 
them. £uch a division on party lines cannot easily be 
explained away.
When the Covenant in its final form was presented to 
the Senate, the work of the Administration had, in a sense, 
been completed. The Democrats, under Wilson, were from 
there on mainly on the defensive. They believed that the 
Covenant would accomplish the purpose for which it had been
Stull Eolt, 307,
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designed, end they also believed that the United States would 
be in no wise endangered if it should ratify it as it stood. 
It is possible, all things considered, that if this very same 
Covenant had been drafted by a Republican administration, 
many Republicans would have felt the same way about it. But 
when it did reach the Senate, it was the irreconsilebles, 
mostly Republicans, and the strong reservatlonlsts who took 
it up from there. The purpose of the former group was 
wholly to defeat the treaty outright and to prevent the 
United States from entering into any kind of league what­
ever. The reservatlonlsts, however, all were willing that 
the Senate ratify the treaty, but in most oases a good many 
concessions had to be made before they would cast their 
votes in the affirmative. No doubt some of these men were 
sincere when they maintained that certain American institu­
tions should receive a more air-tight protection than that 
provided in the Covenant Itself. This was particularly 
true of the mild reservatlonlsts, who were much less con­
servative or reactionary than the strong reservatlonlsts, 
and who were much more favorable to ratification of the 
treaty. But none the less, they were all Republicans end, 
as a party, they clung together.
However, if the reservations are examined, they 
might be found much less harmful than their opponents be­
lieved them to be and, from a practical point of view, 
probably less necessary than their more ardent defenders
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claimed. iUrthermore» eu oh mild réservâtlone as those of 
MoCumher end those which the Democrats were for a time 
willing to adopt, were not essentially different from those 
of Lodge which dealt with the same subjects, end about 
which moet of the controversy was centered.^ It was there­
fore the stubbornness of Wilson which prevented a suffi­
cient number of Democrats from compromising on these 
matters. By the time the treaty was voted upon in November, 
1919, practically all the Republicans were irrevocably en­
trenched and more important, the public had definitely 
come to approve the reservations. It was therefore only 
party allegiance or subserviency to Wilson which thereafter 
caused most of the Democrats to stand fast as they did and. 
In fact, to defeat the treaty.^ Many of the Democrats, in 
other words, may be held responsible for their failure to 
realize that compromise was a characteristic means of 
attaining ends in our democratic society.
Many Republicans, however, may also be charged with 
a few shortcomings. The League Covenant bore no marks 
which were peculiarly Democratic or Wilsonian in character. 
There was therefore no excuse for any Republican, regard­
less of his stand, to be motivated by partisan sympathies
2yor a critical examination of the Lodge reservations, 
see Bailey, The Great Betrayal, 154-67. See also David 
Jayne Hill, TPhe Senate’s service to the Nation,” North 
American Review, C C U  (January, 1920), 16,
^Bailey, The Greet Betrayal. 170-2,
4lbld,. 187-9, 272,
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OP by personal animosity toward the President, To what ex­
tent such sentiments did motivate the Republicans Is In 
many cases problematical, but the League Covenant, which 
was certainly designed for a worthy purpose, should have 
been considered on its own merits, end not in regard to 
whom or to what party was responsible for its inception.
It is obvious that Senator Lodge end many others had 
Woodrow Wilson and the Democratic party uppermost in 
mind when they chose to deal wlthvthe Covenant as they 
dld,̂
There were also those Republicans who, as noted, were 
probably sincere in believing that the League of Nations 
should be considered very cautiously end with due regard 
to the welfare of American institutions. They were isola­
tionists at heart, that is, such a revolutionary idea was 
too much for them to accept without putting up some kind 
of opposition. If this attitude is difficult to pin down 
as essentially Republican in character, it can only be 
said that many Democrats might have taken the same stand 
were it not for the loyalty which they felt they owed to
^ h e  best indication of Lodge’s motives in his own 
book. The Senate end the League of Nations. Lodge states in 
one instance that there was one thing which he had "very 
much at heart, and that was that if we were successful in 
putting on reservations we should create a situation where. 
If the acceptance of the treaty was defeated, the Democratic 
party, end especially Mr. Wilson’s friends should be respon­
sible for its defeat, and not the opponents of the treaty 
who were trying to pass it in a form safe for the United 
States." Ibid,. 164. See also Fleming, 474ff; Bailey,
The Great Betrayal, 65-71.
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the party end to their leader, Woodrow Wilson. With the ex­
ception of Grover Cleveland, Wilson had been the first Demo­
crat as well as the first southerner to be elected president 
since the Civil War. It could be argued, therefore, that 
the Democrats had their hour, and that they had to make the 
most of it.
paradoxically, it was the irreconcilables, a minority 
group, who triumphed in the end. They could not have de­
feated the treaty by themselves, but because of the politi­
cal differences of the other groups, they emerged as the 
final spokesmen of the attitude which was to mould the 
policies of the United States for a good many years to come.
The Northwest senators, as representatives of the 
several factions of the senate of 1919, offer good examples 
of the various kinds of personalities which figured in the 
great dispute of that year. From the most confirmed of 
isolationists to the most vociferous champions of inter­
national cooperation, many motives, personal, moral and 
political, ere revealed in the attitudes of these men. 
imong the irreconcilables and strong reservatlonlsts, there 
were those who betrayed rather jealous dispositions, and 
then there were others of the same group whose sincerity 
would be more difficult to question. On the other hand, 
among the friends of the League, certain of them stand out 
as the more profoundly convinced that the United States 
should openly participate with the other nations in this 
ambitious effort to ensure future peace.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
126
The moet memorable of the Northwest senators, perhaps 
the most memorable of all the senators, was Borah of Idaho, 
the "soul of the irreconcilables," The United States, as 
seen by Borah, was that United States which was dedicated 
to a noble proposition. To him, therefore, the hope of 
this country end, in a sense, of the world, lay not in a 
tribunal run by the "gathered scum of the nations," but in 
those hallowed principles of liberty, equality and demo­
cracy which, in its efforts, the United States so wonder­
fully embodied and exemplified. He believed that, if the 
United States should join the League of Nations, the 
principles of this nation would be contaminated or tainted 
by those Old World institutions which were the very anti­
thesis of Americanism. He never contended that the United 
States, as a democratic nation, was without shortcomings of 
its own, but he believed that it was the basic principles 
upon which this nation had been founded that were the sole 
means by which it could work out its own great destiny.
The League of Nations, in short, would have given the 
death knell to those righteous endeavors which the United 
States alone, it seemed, was capable of putting forth.
Among the opponents of Wilson, Borah stood alone in 
one significant respect. Throughout the stormy career of 
the treaty, none was more profoundly opposed to it, and 
none was so obviously sincere as he. Like many other sena­
tors, he freely flaunted such controversial issues as the 
Irish question, British "designs" and imperialism, and
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Shantung, To what extent these things really concerned him 
is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain, but whatever 
the justification of their use, it could be maintained that 
Borah’s personal and honest fear for the fate of his re­
public excused the means by which he chose to defend it.
Then too, he "unjustices" which werecembodied in these 
issues were, in fact, out of keeping with his own professed 
convictions. His was basically a moral complaint, and as 
such would have been difficult to refute.
With regard to the other Northwest senators of the 
Borah camp— Gronna and Poindexter— other features are 
noticeable, senator Gronna*s opposition was of a milder, 
or rather a shallower sort than that of Borah, although he 
was no doubt honest. He had been an isolationist and paci­
fist during the war, and these considerations were not in­
consistent with his later stand against the League. Poin­
dexter, however, cut a different figure from both the others. 
His speeches on the League were pervaded by a spirit of 
bitterness end vindictiveness, and the observer cannot help 
but question the purposes for which he invoked such isola­
tionist shibboleths as the figures of Washington or Monroe 
or, for that matter his brandishing of anything else which 
he claimed was symbolic of our threatened American Republic.
Poindexter was a strongly partisan Republican, and 
as such he took his stand against the League of Nations.
His opening attack in February, 1919, was certainly one of 
defiance, and it was something more than stupidity which
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led hlm to brand the Covenant as a Southern conspiracy to 
avenge the South’s defeat of 1865. It would appear. In 
short, that Poindexter’s opposition to the Covenant was 
one against something peculiarly bothersome and. In parti­
cular, against something Wilsonian.
The strong reservatlonlsts beer some resemblance to 
the Irreconcilable senators, were It not for the Lodge 
reservations, which rendered the treaty harmless to their 
satisfaction, most probably none of them would have voted 
In Its favor. It was their marked reluctance. In fact 
their virtual refusal, to abandon any of the traditional 
American policies which closely related them to the frank 
opponents of the treaty.
Among these men. Senators Sterling and Warren were 
without doubt possessed of a righteous concern for the 
welfare of this country when they chose to stand as they 
 ̂ did. Senator Jones might have shared the same feelings, 
but he spoke also as a Republican and as a bitter opponent 
of Wilson. It Is obvious that he was willing to ratify 
the treaty, but he wanted it his way or not at all.
Both of these groups— irreconcilables and strong 
reservatlonlsts— shared many things in common. The strong 
reservatlonlsts were isolationists at heart In that they 
were noticeably apprehensive over the unprecedented step 
which, it seemed, the United States was about to take. All 
of them, moreover, spoke as conservative Americans, un­
willing or unable to realize that the spirit which they
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reflected was that of a day that had passed. The one group, 
the irreconcilables, strove with adamant determination to 
preserve the old ways and to prevent the inauguration of the 
new. The other group, the strong reservatlonlsts, were al­
most equally determined to preserve the old, and only with 
great reluctance were they ready to accept the proposed new 
order.
As revealed in their speeches before the Senate, or 
by their support of the Lodge reservations, the members of 
these groups also shared the same feelings on more speci­
fic issues. They were all strongly determined that the 
Monroe Doctrine should remain in force as the unilateral 
American policy in the Western Hemisphere. (Jones, for 
example, had gone so far as to declare the Monroe Doctrine 
to be an American domestic policy.) They were, implicitly 
or explicitly, keenly distrustful of the nations with which 
the United States would have to deal as a member of the 
League of Nations, and they were at all times determined 
that nothing ever was to threaten or usurp the supreme 
sovereignty of the United States when it came to any ques­
tion which they believed was vital to its own interests.
They were also very reluctant, to say the least, to assume 
without all kinds of limitations the "vest and incalculable 
obligation" which Article 10, for example, seemed to impose 
upon the members of the League. Article 10 seemed to them 
more likely to foment trouble or war than to guarantee a 
reasonable peace.
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In the déclamations of these senators, many of their 
misgivings and complaints were far-fetched and, at times, 
inconsistent and irrelevant, Poindexter, for example, once 
said that the facility with which boundary disputes had been 
settled between the United states and Great Britain was one 
of the reasons which precluded the necessity of a league of 
nations. Yet months later, he claimed that the same Great 
Britain might attempt to lay claim to several counties in the 
state of Maine and that the friends of Great Britain on the 
Assembly would most likely support such a claim. The proba­
bility that Great Britain would have considered such a thing 
could be questioned, and it might also be asked who were the 
friends of Great Britain on the Assembly who would have sup­
ported such a claim if it were made. All these senators, 
moreover, were anxious that the other nations of the world 
be excluded from any jurisdiction in the western Hemisphere, 
and that the United States should in turn either refuse or 
consider extremely carefully its own interference in the 
affairs of the rest of the world. Yet at the same time half 
of them were perfectly willing to plunge into the purely- 
British Irish affair and they ell expressed strong concern 
over the Japanese retention of interests in China's shan­
tung,^ Borah, for example, who so consistently harangued
^Gronna, Jones and Borah each supported the Irish 
reservation of March, 1920. Congressional Record, 66 Con­
gress, 2 Session, LIZ, 4532. Sterling, however, consi­
dered the Irish question to be irrelevant. Ibid., 4506.
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against a system which would embroil this country in the 
quarrels of Europe, was practically ready to fight Japan on 
behalf of China.^
Obviously, the irreconsilables were using every 
possible means at their disposal to brand the Covenant 
(which carried with it the treaty of peace) as an instru­
ment of oppression and injustice as well as a terrible 
danger to this country. Their purpose was solely to defeat 
it, and not to defend it or strive for improvements in a 
type of document which they certainly knew was incapable 
of perfection. The strong reservatlonlsts were also off 
the trajck when they undertook to worry over the fete of 
Shantung or, as did Warren, over the Italian claim to 
Flume. They never admitted that such things as the Shan­
tung and flume settlements were international questions, 
and as such could have been amicably settled by the League 
of Nations itself. These concerns were irrelevant and in­
consistent, if well meant.
The mild reservatlonlsts in the Northwest, Senators 
MoNary and LieCumber, were undoubtedly the most openly avowed 
friends of the League of Nations among all the leservationlsts 
in the Senate. In fact, their long pleas for international 
cooperation are indistinguishable from the equally earnest 
pleas of many of the Democrats. Differing from others, 
their purpose in adopting reservations was to sooth popular
^Daily, The Greet Betrayal. 162-3.
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misgivings as wall as the fears, real or pretended, of many 
of the other senators. It is a matter for some conjecture 
whether reservations to the treaty should have been adopted, 
but when McKary and McCumber did back a number of the Lodge 
reservations, they stopped at that point. Differing again 
from the other reservationists, especially the stronger ones, 
they spoke from there on as ardent internationalists, and 
not as conservative Americans or isolationists. Each of 
these men did his best to refute the arguments of the oppo­
nents of the League end to convince everyone that withdrawal 
from the affairs of the world was both'immoral and improvi­
dent. To be sure, they were not themselves unconcerned with 
such issues as the Monroe Doctrine, domestic questions and 
national sovereignty, but they were much less fearful than 
other senators that such things would be endangered if the 
United Ltatea should join the League. Also, they supported 
the Covenant in the only spirit in which such a thing should 
have been supported— with the avowed and unequivocal convic­
tion that a League of Nations was necessary if the peace cf 
the world was to be preserved.
McCumber was undoubtedly the most exemplary of all 
the senators, at least among those who were friendly to the 
League. At the very beginning he practically deserted his 
own party and pleaded for American participation in the 
League when only a handful of the Republicans could possibly
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have shown signs of sympathy for the newly-created Covenant*® 
And in later days he took a rather lonely stand as the only 
Repuhlioan on the foreign Relations Committee to defend the 
treaty as an instrument of good instead of.treating it as 
something dangerous or evil. £o anxious was be to see the 
treaty ratified that he, as the only Republican, was willing 
to support it both with and without the reservations*
Closely related to MoNary and McCumber were the North­
west Democrats, notably Walsh, Nugent and Johnson. Each of 
these men also foresaw the exigencies of a later age and 
they were also aware that the splendor and wisdom of isola­
tion were things of the past. Walsh distinguished himself 
by his compromising spirit when he pleaded with the mass of 
Democrats in the Senate not to kill the treaty Just because 
the Lodge reservations were attached.^ And Nugent also, in 
March, 1919, actually supported most of the Lodge reserva­
tions, no doubt acting in the same spirit as had Walsh. 
Johnson, however, was one of the three Democrats from 
north of the Mason and Dixon line who was unwilling to 
compromise with the Republicans, but he did recognize, as 
did the others, that a concerted international effort was 
necessary if peace in the world was to be maintained. The
®0n the very day on which the Round Robin was signed, 
McCumber made a long speech in favor of the League. This was 
even before the first draft of the Covenant had been revised. 
Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 session, LVII, 4872-82.
9Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LIX, 4581.
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remarks of Senator Myers were most likely of dubious value 
in 80 far as any effect upon the Senate was concerned, but 
Myers also was of an impartial mind when he chose to support 
the reservations "in the Interest of compromising and getting 
together."
If these senators— the Democrats and the mild reser­
vationists— appear to have repudiated the arguments or the 
philosophies of the irreconcilables, or if. In their atti­
tudes, they appear to have transcended either of the stronger 
and more conservative groups, the latter none the less re­
mained unaffected from beginning to end. Many of the re­
marks of Walsh, Nugent, MoNary or McCumber were made as 
challenges to the attacks of other senators, but through­
out the controversy the others remained entrenched and im­
pervious. In fact, it was a number of the Democrats who, 
in later days, showed the greater propensity to compro­
mise.^® Needless to say, however, too few of them showed 
such willingness as would have ratified the treaty.
In an attempt to discover in what degree these North­
west senators reflected the sentiments of their constitu­
ents, or in what manner they represented any regional 
sentiments, a number of paradoxes would render such a task 
difficult to undertake. To begin with, in the case of North 
Dakota, there were two senators, both Republicans, one of 
whom was a confirmed opponent of the League, end the other
lOsailey, The Great Betrayal. 262-3, 271-2.
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one of the most vociferous champions of ratification. It 
would be difficult to assume that Gronna*s opposition was 
a typically North Dakota opposition, and that üCCUmber's 
opposite views stemmed from the same basic temperament.
Moreover, when the legislature of North Dakota sub­
mitted Its petitions for ratification to the United states 
Senate, it did not do so by way of McCumber, but by way of 
Gronna, who ignored its a d v i c e . A l s o  when the legisla­
ture of Idaho presented its petition against ratification.
It did so through Senator Nugent of that state, who ignored
Its precepts and acted, as he pleased, in supporting the 
12treaty.
Furthermore, when President Bllson made his famous 
tour of the west, he did so to appeal to the people on be­
half of his Covenant which, at that time, September, 1919,
was suffering all kinds of opposition in the Senate. But 
the reception which Wilson received, especially in the 
Northwest, would serve again to indicate that the senators 
were individuals, and did not necessarily have their con­
stituents behind them.^^ In Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, the 
ovation was so generous and warm-hearted that it was obvious
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 49-50; Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, 
LIZ, 1208,
IBçoneressional Peoord. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 132.
^^For an account of this Journey, see Bailey, The 
Great Betrayal. 101-10.
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that the people of that area did not share the sentiments of 
their own Senator Borah, And in the cities of Spokane, 
Seattle end Tacoma, in Washington, the reception given 
Wilson was of such an intense jubilance as to approach fan­
aticism. Here again was a population which did not harbor 
the strong feelings of Poindexter or Jones.
And, significantly, while Wilson was making this 
seemingly successful appeal, Borah and Poindexter, among 
others, took to the stumps in an effort to neutralize what­
ever affects Wilson’s journey might have had. Borah spoke
at Chicago, the anti-Wilson city which Wilson had avoided,
14and Poindexter made his appeal farther east,
Borah, of course, was the most ardent of all the 
anti-league senators in his own hatred for the League. He 
might well not have faltered in his promise when he an­
nounced, on one occasion, that he would have opposed the
thing even if Christ Himself were on earth and favored 
15it. But he also made another statement which was most
probably endorsed by a good many of the other senators:
I shall not remain silent out of fear of being called 
a carping critic, . .1 know of no higher duty devolving 
upon a Senator than. . .to advocate his own beliefs and 
his own views.
l^ibld.. 127-8,
^^Hamilton Holt, "The Senate Versus the People," 
Independent. ICVIII (June 7, 1919), 551-2.
^^Congreeslonal Record. 65 Congress, 3 Session, 
LVII, 2425.
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It wee, in reality, the United States Senate which 
rejected the League of Nations. The American people approved 
of the Covenant in one form or another and in due time their 
enthusiasm waned. But it was the long end heated debates in 
the Senate which caused the public's attitude to change, and 
it was the long and indecisive deadlock which caused the 
people eventually to become indifferent to the fate of the 
League* The Senate, as a body, was not preoccupied with 
the rest of the world, and because it was unwilling to look 
outward and ahead, and to forget that it was dealing with a 
subject which was peculiar to no party or person, the League 
of Nations on its own merits remained throughout an almost 
secondary issue.
That the United States should have joined the League 
of Nations would now be less easily disputed. American 
membership in that organization would not necessarily have 
prevented the Second World War, nor would it necessarily 
have altered or prevented other things which were to come.
But such gains would not have been impossible of attainment, 
end the United States would probably have had little to 
lose. The efforts of this country might well have had, as 
Senator Thomas Sterling hoped, "a stabilizing and steadying 
effect upon the conditions there."
The Northwest senators who participated in this, the 
greatest debate in the history of the senate, are now passed 
and gone. But looking backward, the orations of a number of 
them stand out above all the others as examples of foresight
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and concern for the welfare of this nation as well as of the 
world. The necessity of world organization, as preached by 
all the defenders of the League, is now fully appreciated, 
and many of the dire predictions of Johnson, Nugent and 
McCumber have also been realized and might yet be more com­
pletely fulfilled. The League of Nations was crippled at 
birth, but the later realization that such a thing was the 
only hope for the world will recall the prophetic words of 
Senator McCumber so many years ago:
All that we can be sure of is that tne instrument 
comes to us as a compromise, and in it is the soul of 
a future world freedom. It is within our power to 
strangle the body, but the soul will live and ever 
seek reembodiment in some future International or­
ganization.
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TH2 COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE 
OF NATIONS^
Article 1
Section 3. Any member of the League may, after two 
years* notice of its intention to do so, withdraw from the 
League, provided that all its international obligations and 
all its obligations under this covenant shall have been ful­
filled at the time of its withdrawal.
Article 5
Section 1, Except where otherwise expressly provided 
in this covenant, or by the terms of this treaty, decisions 
at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall re­
quire the agreement of all the members of the League repre­
sented at the meeting.
Article 8
Section 1, The members of the League recognize that 
the maintenance of a peace requires the reduction of national 
armaments to the lowest point consistent with the national 
safety and the enforcement by common action of international 
obligations.
Section 2, The Council, taking account of the geo­
graphical situation end circumstances of each State, shall 
formulate plans for the consideration and action of the 
several Governments.
Section 5. The members of the League undertake to 
interchange full end frank information as to the scale of 
their armaments, their military and naval programs and the 
condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to 
warlike purposes.
^Taken from "Full Text of the Revised Covenant of the 
League of Nations," Current History. I (June, 1919), 509-15.
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Article 10
The members of the League undertake to respeot and 
preaerre as against external aggression the territorial in­
tegrity and existing political independence of all the mem­
bers of the League. In case of any such aggression or in 
case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council 
shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall 
be fulfilled.
Article 11
Section 1. Any war or threat of war, whether imme­
diately effecting any of the members of the League or not, 
is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, 
and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise 
and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case 
any such emergency should arise, the Secretary General shall, 
on the request of any member of the League, forthwith 
summon a meeting of the Council.
Section _2. It is also declared to be the fundamental 
right of each member of the League to bring to the attention 
of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever 
affecting International relations which threatens to disturb 
either the peace or the good understanding between nations 
upon which peace depends.
Article 15
Section %. If the dispute between the parties is 
claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise 
out of a matter which by international law is solely within 
the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall 
so report end shall make no recommendations as to its settle­
ment.
Section 8. The Council may in any case under this 
article refer the dispute to the Assaably. The dispute shall 
be 80 referred at the request of either party to the dispute, 
provided that such request is made within fourteen days after 
the submission of the dispute to the Council.
Section 9, In any ease referred to the Assembly all 
the provisions of this article and of Article H I  relating 
to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the 
action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report 
made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the representatives 
of those members of the League represented on the Council
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and of a majority of the other members of the League, ez- 
oluaive In each case of the representatives of the parties 
to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by 
the Council concurred In by all the members thereof other 
than the representatives of one or more of the parties to 
the dispute*
Article 21
Nothing In this covenant shall be deemed to effect the 
validity of International engagements such as treaties of ar­
bitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine 
for securing the maintenance of peace.
THE LODGE RESERVATIONS
"(Those of November, 1919 appear unlndanted; those of 
March, 1920, were exactly the same, except that the Italicized 
and bracketed passages were deleted, and the Indented passages 
were added. • . • For originals, see Cong. Record. 66 Cong.,
1 seas., p. 0773; Ibid.. 2 eess., p. 4599.)"%
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present oonour- 
flng therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany concluded 
at Versailles on the 23th day of June, 1919, subject to the 
following reservations and understandings, which are hereby 
made a pert and condition of this resolution of ratifica­
tion, which ratification Is not to take effect or bind the 
United States until the said reservations and understandings 
adopted by the Senate have been accepted /by an exchange of 
notes as _a part and a condition of this resolution of rati­
fication by at least three of the four principle alTled 
and associated powers, to wî7. Great Britain. France. Italy. 
end Japan; /
as a part and a condition of this resolution of rati­
fication by the allied and associated powers and a 
failure on the part of the allied end associated 
powers to make objection to said reservations and 
understandings prior to the deposit of ratification 
by the United States shall be taken as a full and 
final acceptance of such reservations and under­
standings by said powers:
1. The United States so understands and construes 
article 1 that In case of notice of withdrawal from the 
league of nations, as provided In said article, the United
^As arranged and explained by Bailey, The Great
Betrayal. 387-92,
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States shall be the sole Judge aa to whether all its Inter­
national obligations and all its obligations under the said 
covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by 
the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution 
of the Congress of the United States,
2, The United States assumes no obligation to pre­
serve the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any other country/or to interfere in controversies be­
tween natione— whether members of the league or not--un?er 
the provisions of article 10."or to employ the military or 
naval forces of the United States under any article of tïïê 
treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case tE'e" 
Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power 
to declare war or authorize the employment of thelmlTitery 
or naval forces of the United States, shall by act.or joint 
resolution so provide. 7
by the employment of its military or naval forces, its 
resources, or any form of economic discrimination, or 
to interfere in any way in controversies between nations, 
including all controversies relating to territorial In- 
. têgrity or apolitical Independence, whether members of the 
league or not, under the provisions of article 10, or 
to employ the military or naval forces for any purpose, 
unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under 
the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or 
authorize the employment of the military or naval forces 
of the United states, shall in the exercise of full 
liberty of action, by act or Joint resolution so provide.
4. The United states reserves to itself exclusively 
the right to decide what questions are within its domestic 
Jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political 
questions relating wholly or in part to Its internal affairs, 
including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, 
commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children 
end opium and other dangerous drugs, end all other domestic 
questions, ere solely within the Jurisdiction of the United 
States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any 
way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the 
council or of the assembly of the league of nations, or
any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation 
of any other power.
5. The United States will not submit to arbitration 
or to inquiry by the assembly or by the council of the 
league of nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any 
questions which in the Judgment of the United States depend 
upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly 
known as the Monroe doctrine; said doctrine is to be in-
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terpreted by the United States alone and la hereby declared 
to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said league of na­
tions and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in 
the said treaty of peace with Germany.
6. The United States withholds Its assent to articles 
156, 157, end 158 /regarding Shantung/, and reserves full 
liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may 
arise under said articles /between the Republic of China 
end the Empire of Japan/.
10. /If the United States shell at any time adopt 
any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the 
council of the league of nations under the provisions of 
article 8, reserves the right to increase such armaments 
without the consent of the council whenever the United 
States Is threatened with Invasion or engaged in war. /
No plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the 
council of the League of Nations under the provisions of 
article 8 shall be held as binding the United states 
until the seme shall have been accepted by Congress, and 
the United States reserves the right to Increase Its 
armament without the consent of the council whenever the 
United States Is threatened with Invasion or engaged in 
war.
14. /The United States assumes no obligation to be 
bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the 
council or assembly In v/hlch any member of the league end '
Its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire.
In the aggregate have oast more than one vote, end assumes 
no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or find­
ings of the council or eesembly arising out of any ?Tspute 
between the United States end any member of the league If 
such Q member, or any self-governing dominion, oblony, em­
pire ."“or part of empire united with it politically has voted./
Until Part I, being the covenant of the League of Nations, 
shall be so amended as to provide that the United states 
shall be entitled to cast a number of votes equal to that 
which any member of the league end Its self-governing 
dominions, colonies, or parts of empire. In the aggregate 
shall be entitled to oast, the United States assumes no 
obligation to be bound, except in cases where Congress 
has previously given Its consent, by any election, de­
cision, report, or finding of the council or assembly In 
which any member of the league and Its self-governing 
dominions, colonies, or parts of empire In the aggregate
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hare cast more than one vote.
The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by 
any decision, report, or finding, of the council or 
assembly arising out of any dispute between the United 
States and any member of the league if such member, or 
any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of 
empire united with it politically has voted.
15. In consenting to the ratification of the treaty 
with Germany the United States adheres to the principle of 
self-determination end to the resolution of sympathy with 
the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of 
their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and 
declares that when such government is attained by Ireland, 
a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly 
be admitted as a member of the League of Nations.
ZNDOR&mENT OF THE LEAGUE
BY THE NORTH DAKOTA
»3STATE LEGISLATURE
Department of State 
State of North Dakota
To all to whom these presents shall come?
I, Thomas Hall, secretary of state for the state of 
North Dakota, do hereby set forth and certify that the 
following is the full text and the whole thereof of a cer­
tain concurrent resolution adopted by the sixteenth legis­
lative assembly of the State of North Dakota.
Dated at the capital in Bismarck, N. Dak., this 3d 
day of March, 1919.
/Seal_y
Thomas Hall, 
Secretary of state.
Concurrent resolution favoring the establishment of 
a league of nations to enforce peace, and aim at promoting 
the liberty, progress, and orderly development of the world,
Whereas the war now brought to a victorious close by the 
associated power of the free nations of the world was 
above all else a war to end war and protect human 
rights; Therefore be it
«'̂ Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 49-50.
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Resolved by the Senate of the State of North Dakota (the 
House of Representatives Conourrlnf?;) « That we favor the 
establishment of a league of nations of which the United 
States shall be a member. We believe that such a league 
should elm at promoting the liberty, progress, and orderly 
development of the world; that it should clinch the victory
won at such terrible sacrifice by having the united potential
force of all its members as a standing menace against any 
nation that seeks to upset the peace of the world; be it 
further
Resolved, that certified copies of this resolution be 
sent by the secretary of state to the President and to the
presiding officers of both branches of Congress and to
each of the United States Senators and Representatives from 
the State of North Dakota.
SECOND NORTH DAKOTA RESOLUTION
United states of America, 
Department of State, 
State of North Dakota.
To all to whom these presents shall come;
I, William J. Prater, secretary of the senate of the 
special session of the Sixteenth Legislative Assembly of 
the State of North Dakota, do hereby declare and certify 
that the following concurrent resolution was introduced in 
the senate by Senator Thorwald Mostad; was passed by the 
senate December 10, 1919, and concurred in by the house of 
representatives December 10, 1919.
Dated at Bismarck, N. Dak., this 10th day of December, 
A.D., 1919.
/Sealjf
William J. Prater 
Secretary of the senate
Concurrent Resolution
Be it resolved by the Senate, the house of representa­
tives concurring.
Recognizing and commending the splendid service President 
Wilson rendered to his country and to all mankind through 
his untiring efforts as a statesman to secure world peace, 
we regret that his health and physical strength became ex­
hausted before his work for peace of the world was completed.
^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, 
LIX, 1208,
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We ask for a apeedy ratification of the peace treaty 
with only such reservations as are compatible with a binding 
and bona fide participation by the United States of America 
in the covenant of the league of nations. The honor of our 
arms and our devotion to the principles of democracy demand 
that Congress take action to bring about peace to a war- 
weary world at the very earliest date possible.
Be it further resolved. That the secretary of state send 
a copy of these resolutions to President Woodrow Wilson and 
to each Member of Congress from North Dakota.
RESOLUTION AGAINST RATIFICATION 
BY THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE^
State of Idaho,
Department of state.
I, Robert 0. Jones, secretary of state of the state 
of Idaho, do hereby certify that the annexed is a full, true 
and complete transcript of enrolled house joint memorial No.
£0, which was filed in this office on the 17th day of March,
Â.D., 1919, and admitted to record.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed the great seal of the state. Done at Boise City, the 
Capital of Idaho, this £8th day of April, A.D., 1919 and of 
the independence of the United States of America the one 
hundred and forty-third.
2seal_y
Robert 0. Jones
Secretary of State.
To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress Assembled;
Your memorialists, the House of Representatives end 
Senate of the State of Idaho, respectfully represent that—
Whereas section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the
United States gives the President power to make treaties 
by end with the advice end consent of the senate; and 
Whereas there is now In progress the greatest peace-nego­
tiating conclave In the history of the world, the 
United States being one of the members of said con­
vention; and
Whereas the President of the United states has, contrary to
^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, 
LVIII, 132.
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the wishes and desires of the majority of the people 
of the United States of America, and without the advice 
or consent of the Senate of the United states, attempted 
to foist upon the American people as one of the essen­
tial elements of the treaties of peace to be promulgated 
by said convention a proposition favoring and organizing 
a so-called league of nations; and 
Whereas the substance of the proposed draft of the so-called 
league of nations is obscure, vague, ambiguous, and tend­
ing to bring about greater confusion and distrust and 
hostility among the various nations of the world; and 
Whereas the theory of said league of nations is impracticable, 
visionary, and subversive of the international principle 
heretofore controlling in the foreign relationships of 
the United states of America; and 
Whereas the President of the United States has defied Con­
gress end the people of the United States to oppose the 
organization of such a league of nations; and 
Whereas some 37 Senators have pledged themselves to oppose 
the ratification of a treaty adopting said league of 
nations; now therefore, be it
Resolved. That we, the gouse of Representatives of the 
State of Idaho, the Senate concurring, do earnestly request 
and recommend that the Senate of the United States oppose 
absolutely the theory as indicated by the constitution of 
the league of nations and oppose said constitution of the 
league of nations becoming a part of or being in any way in­
cluded in the peace treaties to be made or entered into by 
the United states; and be it further
Resolved. That they hereby ratify and give their un­
qualified approval to the stand and position taken by the 
above-mentioned 37 Senators in recording themselves as 
opposed to said league of nations at the present time; end 
be it further
Resolved. That they resent the defiant and dictatorial 
attitude of the President of the United states in his recent 
statements in which he has attempted to force his personal 
views and opinions upon the people of the United States 
irrespective of their desires in the matter.
The secretary of State of Idaho is hereby instructed to 
forward this memorial to the Senate and House of Representa­
tives of the United States of America, end to send copies of 
the same to our Senators and Representatives in Congress.
This house joint memorial passed the house on the 6th 
day of March, 1919.
M. A. Kiger, 
Speaker of the House 
of Representatives
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This house Joint memorial passed the senate on the 8th 
day of March, 1919.
C. C. Moore, 
President of the Senate
I hereby certify that the within house Joint memorial No, 
20 originated in the house of representatives during the 
fifteenth session of the Legislature of the State of Idaho.
David Burrell, 
Chief Clerk of the 
House of Representatives
STATE COmiTTEEMEN OF TEE 
LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE®
Idaho; Executive Committee, James Hawley, Boise; 
National Committee, S. B. Hayes; ft. W. Deal, Master of the 
Idaho State Grange, Nampa.
Montana: National Committee, F. S. Cooley, Director
of Extension, Montana State College, Bozeman; U. M. Donaghue, 
Butte; Samuel V. Stewart, vice president, Helena.
North Dakota; Dr. E. F, Ladd, North Dakota College 
of Agriculture; Louis B. Hanna, Fargo; Mrs. Frank fthite. 
Valley City; vice presidents A. A. Bruce, Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of North Dakota, and Lynn J. Frazier, 
Bismarck.
Oregon; National Committee, W. J. Kerr, Pres., 
Agricultural College; Gen. F. Beebe, Portland, C. S* Jackson, 
Portland; vice presidents James Wlthycombe, Salem and Henry 
L. Corbett, Portland.
South Dakota; National Committee, ft. C. Allen, 
Aberdeen; Mrs. Fred H. Hollister, Sioux Falls; Vice presi­
dent Peter Norbcok, Pierre,
Washington; Executive Committee, Ernest Lister, 
Olympia; National Committee, W. S. Thornber, Director of 
Agricultural Extension, Pullman, Henry suzzalo, University 
of Washington; William E. Cowles, Spokane; Mrs, Overton G. 
Ellis, Tacoma; vice president J. E, Chilberg, Seattle.
Wyoming; National Committee, Mrs. Harnsberger,
Lander; Professor Harvey L. Eby, University of Wyoming;
Gibld.. 7483-6.
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vice presidents Robert D. Carey and frank L. Houz, Cheyenne.
PETITION FAVORING RATIFICATION?
(signed by representative citizens 
of thirty-nine states)
Idaho; ex-governor James H. Hawley
Montana: Governor Samuel V. Stewart
North Dakota; Governor Lynn J. Frazier, and Dr.
Edwin F. Ladd, President of the Agricultural College of 
North Dakota.
Oregon; Judge Charles H. Carey; Richard W. Montague; 
Bishop Walter Taylor Sumner; William D. Wheelright.
South Dakota; Willis C. Cook, member National Rail­
ways Commission; ex-governor and ex-United States Senator 
Coe I. Crawford; Thomas 0*Gorman, Bishop of Sioux Falls;
Mrs. John H. Pyle, President, south Dakota Equal Suffrage 
Society; H. K. Warren, President of Yankton College.
Washington; N. B. Coffman, president of the Wash­
ington Bankers* Association; Charles w. Fasaet, Mayor of 
Spokane; Bishop Frederick w. Keator; Josephine Carliss 
Preston, President, National Education Association.
Wyoming; Harry W. Fox, President, State Federation 
of Labor; Duncan McLeod, International Executive Board, 
United Mine Workers of America; James Morgan, Secretary of 
the Miners* Organization.
?Ibid.. 5363-5.
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